In 2021, hypersonic weapon tests conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) elicited concerns in the U.S. due to the delivery system reminiscent of the Cold War: Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). The attempts were followed by two competing assessments—alarmism and optimism—which hindered constructive understanding of the occurrence in public. To explore the alleged capability, this article juxtaposes Chinese FOBS with the antecedent. The comparison aims to highlight what differentiates, if any, the 2021 Chinese FOBS from its predecessor. The analysis selects three variables—capabilities, detection and interception mechanisms they face, and how they were acknowledged by Washington. Each factor, except the submunition capability of Chinese FOBS, seems to suggest that the Chinese FOBS tests are not Sputnik moment. Conversely, the HGV-submunition capability is worth garnering attention, given its ramifications to strategic stability.