2026年6月4日、モンゴル・ウランバートルで開催された第11回ウランバートル対話の初日セッション１で、「安全保障協力体制の構想」ユニット長の岩間陽子政策研究大学院大学教授がパネリストとして登壇し、講演とディスカッションを行いました。
以下にその講演内容を掲載します。
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to be back in Ulaanbaatar.
I would like to thank all the organizers for making this possible. It's really remarkable that a country like Mongolia is making this possible each year.
It's been one year since I was sitting here, and a lot of things have happened since then. We are facing far greater challenges in Northeast Asia, but there have also been historic changes in my country. It is my personal pleasure to announce that Japan has its first female prime minister in history. I really didn't think a day like this would come in my life time. Sanae Takechi became the first female Prime Minister on 21 October 2025. Her election was quite unexpected, but she has proven to be a strong and popular leader since then. More than 70% of the people supported her at the beginning of the administration and her approval rate remains at more than 50% even after seven months in office. Support for her handling of foreign and security policy is much higher than that of previous governments. In August 2024, people who approved or somewhat approved of the government's handling of foreign security policy was 23.8%. Recently, it has risen to 38.4%. We are conducting this survey called SAFER Security Alliance Foreign Engagement Research Project at ROLES at University of Tokyo. You will get all the quotes in my paper when it comes out (1).
She called a snap election on February 26. An election in the middle of winter is pretty rare in Japan, but she won the bet and came out very strongly. Her party won 316 seats in the lower house, exceeding the two-thirds majority of the total of 415 seats. That has added credibility to her call to change the constitution of Japan, which has never been changed since its post-war inauguration. But she still needs to change the balance in the upper house, which is not going to be easy.
Surprisingly, the relationship between Japan and Korea is much better than expected before the start of the administration, to all our surprise and pleasure. But the Sino-Japanese relationship is not in its best shape. On November the 7th 2025, Prime Minister Takaichi, facing questioning from an opposition lawmaker in the Diet, stated that if China were to deploy warships and use force against Taiwan, and if American armed forces were already in action, it could lead to an “survival threatening situation” for Japan, which under Japanese law would allow for use of force in collective self-defense scenarios.
These changes were introduced under the 2015 change in security legislation. This has created a strong reaction from the Chinese side and Sino-Japanese relationship has been in very bad shape since then. At least almost 90% of the people questioned in our survey think that China is a threat. Contrasting even to approximately 80% who think North Korea is a threat. Actually, nearly half of the respondents also think that US now is a threat. Remarkable thing is that Japanese public has been behind the Prime Minister despite all the strong Chinese reactions. This has only strengthened the Japanese people's resolve to stick to the bolstering of its defense, which had already started in the Kishida government with its 2022 National Security Strategy.
It is clear that Japanese people feel that the changes in security policy initiated by the Takaichi government are necessary to navigate through the rough waters, which reflect the instability created by growing challenges from three of our neighbors' countries, Russia, North Korea and China. And we have added instability coming from the American government. We all know that Japan has been very dependent on the United States for its security ever since the end of the Second World War. In the beginning this was partly wished by the United States, and then for a considerable period, Japanese people were even proud of it, but the time of this unequal partnership is over and Japan is changing. So let me introduce some of the recent changes happening under our first female leadership.
One, the Takaichi administration has moved up the revision of the three security-related documents, including the National Security Strategy, from the originally planned 2027 to the end of 2026.
Two, measures were taken to speed up the increase in defense spending. Defense budget of 2% of GDP originally planned to be achieved by first in the fiscal year of 2027, has already been realized this year.
Three, significant “counterstrike capabilities” which was first admitted in National Security Strategy 2022, has been achieved. This year, Japan made significant advances. The upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles are now operational at Camp Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture. With a range of approximately 1,000 kilometres, the new missile represents a substantial upgrade from the original's 200-kilometre reach.
Japan Self Defense Force is also moving forward on the deployment of ground-launched Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP), which is designed primarily to defend Japan's remote islands.
Initial delivery of the ordered 400 Tomahawk missiles arrived from the US in March this year and Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Chokai (DDG-176) became the first Japanese vessel to operate these missiles. Japan intends eventually to deploy Tomahawk missiles across its eight Aegis-equipped destroyers, but problems have surfaced because of the Middle East situation. The United States is currently unable to deliver more missiles, and we are talking about joint production in the future.
Four, Space-Based ISR support. In order to support long-range strike operations, Japan and Finland signed a contract to build an Earth-observation satellite constellation for security, civilian and commercial use. Although with these improved capabilities, Japan will still need U.S. help to track mobile targets.
Five, Rules regarding Arms Export. On April 21st, the Japanese government revised the three principles on transfer of defense equipment and technology as well as the implementation guidelines which govern rules for defense equipment exports. There used to be rules that limited Japan's defense equipment exports to five non-combat categories ---rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping. These limitations are no longer there. Japan will keep in place three export principles committing it to strict screening, controls on transfers to third countries, and ban on sales to countries involved in conflict, though the government said exceptions could be made when deemed necessary for national security.
Six, we are creating National Intelligence Council. Japan has lacked an intelligence institution after the end of the war, and this has been a problem when communicating with our partners. Japan's parliament passed legislation on May 27 2026, to launch the new Intelligence Council. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) will serve as the council's secretariat. It is expected to be operational as early as summer of 2026. It will be formed by upgrading the existing Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office into an organization of over 700 personnel. The head of the NIA will be elevated to a rank equivalent to that of the National Security Secretariat’s Secretary-General.
And the last point is the extended deterrence in Asia and Nonproliferation. Trump administration's policy on burden sharing has been creating ripples across global alliances, more in Europe, but also in Asia. Beneath the surface, there are concerns about the credibility of American extended deterrence. The direct response has been the strengthening of conventional defense capabilities, but discussions have started on nuclear deterrence as well. In Japan, late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe publicly raised the question about nuclear sharing in Japan in 2022. It has been followed by others who proposed stationing of American nuclear weapons in Japan. The percentage of people in Japan who agree or somewhat agree that Japan should have its own nuclear weapons has remained stable around about 17 and 18%. Public trust in US-Japan alliance has also remained very stable with 70-80% of people believing that the U.S. would intervene militarily if North Korea, Russia, or China attacks Japan. More than 60% believe that even in case of Chinese attack on Taiwan, the U.S. would intervene militarily.
The South Koreans are directly facing growing challenges from nuclear North Korea, and they have decided to go ahead with building nuclear propulsion submarines. The details are still ambiguous, but they are moving ahead with domestic production of submarines fueled by low-enriched uranium. The fact that Korea has made a decision to go ahead will probably influence this year's discussion in Japan. There are new discussions going on related to whether or not Japan should also explore the building of its own nuclear-powered submarines, and whether there should be changes to the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” (not to possess, produce or introduce nuclear weapons) should be changed.
So the security situation in Northeast Asia is becoming even more unclear and unstable. The ambiguity of the American leadership has not helped. Asian countries have been reacting with calmness and steadiness, but the change has accelerated.
We have been strengthening our own defense capabilities. This is homework that we had not done for too long, and it’s overdue. But the strengthening of deterrence always needs to be accompanied by efforts for engagement and communication. Otherwise, it will only lead to a spiral of arms race, and we are trying to find a balance, and we do not wish the arms buildup, but the tension to continue indefinitely.
Communication has been breaking down in these several years. We need efforts to reconnect lines of communication and forge new ones where it is not present.
It is needed on a lot of bilateral and multilateral levels. We need to intensify and institutionalize the crisis communication of Japan, South Korea and Australia, the three democratic middle powers of the region that need to stand up and cooperate whenever there’s a crisis.
China needs to be embedded into a network of communications. We need more transparency concerning their intentions and capabilities. US and Russia used to have multilayered communication concerning military exercises, launching of missiles and other types of safeguards related to arms control agreements. Most of these have broken down in these years. We need to reestablish these in trilateral forms of China-Russia-US to start with. And we also need to talk about the nuclear risk reduction measures in the era of artificial intelligence and UAVs.
We are facing increasing challenges which require transparency and willingness to communicate. Ulaanbaatar will be a very good place to start.
Thank you for your attention.
(1)UTokyo ROLES Survey SAFER Project,
https://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/working_group/208
以下にその講演内容を掲載します。
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to be back in Ulaanbaatar.
I would like to thank all the organizers for making this possible. It's really remarkable that a country like Mongolia is making this possible each year.
It's been one year since I was sitting here, and a lot of things have happened since then. We are facing far greater challenges in Northeast Asia, but there have also been historic changes in my country. It is my personal pleasure to announce that Japan has its first female prime minister in history. I really didn't think a day like this would come in my life time. Sanae Takechi became the first female Prime Minister on 21 October 2025. Her election was quite unexpected, but she has proven to be a strong and popular leader since then. More than 70% of the people supported her at the beginning of the administration and her approval rate remains at more than 50% even after seven months in office. Support for her handling of foreign and security policy is much higher than that of previous governments. In August 2024, people who approved or somewhat approved of the government's handling of foreign security policy was 23.8%. Recently, it has risen to 38.4%. We are conducting this survey called SAFER Security Alliance Foreign Engagement Research Project at ROLES at University of Tokyo. You will get all the quotes in my paper when it comes out (1).
She called a snap election on February 26. An election in the middle of winter is pretty rare in Japan, but she won the bet and came out very strongly. Her party won 316 seats in the lower house, exceeding the two-thirds majority of the total of 415 seats. That has added credibility to her call to change the constitution of Japan, which has never been changed since its post-war inauguration. But she still needs to change the balance in the upper house, which is not going to be easy.
Surprisingly, the relationship between Japan and Korea is much better than expected before the start of the administration, to all our surprise and pleasure. But the Sino-Japanese relationship is not in its best shape. On November the 7th 2025, Prime Minister Takaichi, facing questioning from an opposition lawmaker in the Diet, stated that if China were to deploy warships and use force against Taiwan, and if American armed forces were already in action, it could lead to an “survival threatening situation” for Japan, which under Japanese law would allow for use of force in collective self-defense scenarios.
These changes were introduced under the 2015 change in security legislation. This has created a strong reaction from the Chinese side and Sino-Japanese relationship has been in very bad shape since then. At least almost 90% of the people questioned in our survey think that China is a threat. Contrasting even to approximately 80% who think North Korea is a threat. Actually, nearly half of the respondents also think that US now is a threat. Remarkable thing is that Japanese public has been behind the Prime Minister despite all the strong Chinese reactions. This has only strengthened the Japanese people's resolve to stick to the bolstering of its defense, which had already started in the Kishida government with its 2022 National Security Strategy.
It is clear that Japanese people feel that the changes in security policy initiated by the Takaichi government are necessary to navigate through the rough waters, which reflect the instability created by growing challenges from three of our neighbors' countries, Russia, North Korea and China. And we have added instability coming from the American government. We all know that Japan has been very dependent on the United States for its security ever since the end of the Second World War. In the beginning this was partly wished by the United States, and then for a considerable period, Japanese people were even proud of it, but the time of this unequal partnership is over and Japan is changing. So let me introduce some of the recent changes happening under our first female leadership.
One, the Takaichi administration has moved up the revision of the three security-related documents, including the National Security Strategy, from the originally planned 2027 to the end of 2026.
Two, measures were taken to speed up the increase in defense spending. Defense budget of 2% of GDP originally planned to be achieved by first in the fiscal year of 2027, has already been realized this year.
Three, significant “counterstrike capabilities” which was first admitted in National Security Strategy 2022, has been achieved. This year, Japan made significant advances. The upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles are now operational at Camp Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture. With a range of approximately 1,000 kilometres, the new missile represents a substantial upgrade from the original's 200-kilometre reach.
Japan Self Defense Force is also moving forward on the deployment of ground-launched Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP), which is designed primarily to defend Japan's remote islands.
Initial delivery of the ordered 400 Tomahawk missiles arrived from the US in March this year and Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Chokai (DDG-176) became the first Japanese vessel to operate these missiles. Japan intends eventually to deploy Tomahawk missiles across its eight Aegis-equipped destroyers, but problems have surfaced because of the Middle East situation. The United States is currently unable to deliver more missiles, and we are talking about joint production in the future.
Four, Space-Based ISR support. In order to support long-range strike operations, Japan and Finland signed a contract to build an Earth-observation satellite constellation for security, civilian and commercial use. Although with these improved capabilities, Japan will still need U.S. help to track mobile targets.
Five, Rules regarding Arms Export. On April 21st, the Japanese government revised the three principles on transfer of defense equipment and technology as well as the implementation guidelines which govern rules for defense equipment exports. There used to be rules that limited Japan's defense equipment exports to five non-combat categories ---rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping. These limitations are no longer there. Japan will keep in place three export principles committing it to strict screening, controls on transfers to third countries, and ban on sales to countries involved in conflict, though the government said exceptions could be made when deemed necessary for national security.
Six, we are creating National Intelligence Council. Japan has lacked an intelligence institution after the end of the war, and this has been a problem when communicating with our partners. Japan's parliament passed legislation on May 27 2026, to launch the new Intelligence Council. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) will serve as the council's secretariat. It is expected to be operational as early as summer of 2026. It will be formed by upgrading the existing Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office into an organization of over 700 personnel. The head of the NIA will be elevated to a rank equivalent to that of the National Security Secretariat’s Secretary-General.
And the last point is the extended deterrence in Asia and Nonproliferation. Trump administration's policy on burden sharing has been creating ripples across global alliances, more in Europe, but also in Asia. Beneath the surface, there are concerns about the credibility of American extended deterrence. The direct response has been the strengthening of conventional defense capabilities, but discussions have started on nuclear deterrence as well. In Japan, late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe publicly raised the question about nuclear sharing in Japan in 2022. It has been followed by others who proposed stationing of American nuclear weapons in Japan. The percentage of people in Japan who agree or somewhat agree that Japan should have its own nuclear weapons has remained stable around about 17 and 18%. Public trust in US-Japan alliance has also remained very stable with 70-80% of people believing that the U.S. would intervene militarily if North Korea, Russia, or China attacks Japan. More than 60% believe that even in case of Chinese attack on Taiwan, the U.S. would intervene militarily.
The South Koreans are directly facing growing challenges from nuclear North Korea, and they have decided to go ahead with building nuclear propulsion submarines. The details are still ambiguous, but they are moving ahead with domestic production of submarines fueled by low-enriched uranium. The fact that Korea has made a decision to go ahead will probably influence this year's discussion in Japan. There are new discussions going on related to whether or not Japan should also explore the building of its own nuclear-powered submarines, and whether there should be changes to the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” (not to possess, produce or introduce nuclear weapons) should be changed.
So the security situation in Northeast Asia is becoming even more unclear and unstable. The ambiguity of the American leadership has not helped. Asian countries have been reacting with calmness and steadiness, but the change has accelerated.
We have been strengthening our own defense capabilities. This is homework that we had not done for too long, and it’s overdue. But the strengthening of deterrence always needs to be accompanied by efforts for engagement and communication. Otherwise, it will only lead to a spiral of arms race, and we are trying to find a balance, and we do not wish the arms buildup, but the tension to continue indefinitely.
Communication has been breaking down in these several years. We need efforts to reconnect lines of communication and forge new ones where it is not present.
It is needed on a lot of bilateral and multilateral levels. We need to intensify and institutionalize the crisis communication of Japan, South Korea and Australia, the three democratic middle powers of the region that need to stand up and cooperate whenever there’s a crisis.
China needs to be embedded into a network of communications. We need more transparency concerning their intentions and capabilities. US and Russia used to have multilayered communication concerning military exercises, launching of missiles and other types of safeguards related to arms control agreements. Most of these have broken down in these years. We need to reestablish these in trilateral forms of China-Russia-US to start with. And we also need to talk about the nuclear risk reduction measures in the era of artificial intelligence and UAVs.
We are facing increasing challenges which require transparency and willingness to communicate. Ulaanbaatar will be a very good place to start.
Thank you for your attention.
(1)UTokyo ROLES Survey SAFER Project,
https://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/working_group/208
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