Following the end of the Cold War, a discernible shift has been observed in the emphasis placed on the "rule of law" by policymakers within the context of development strategies. This paper discusses the rule of law as a development concern, exploring the underlying principles of rule of law projects and the challenges they face. The discussion is further enriched by an examination of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) for rule of law projects, with a focus on the distinctive features of Japanese ODA in this context.

1.     The Rule of Law as a Focal Concept for Development 

(1) Why Does Law Matter  for Development?

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a notable shift in the emphasis placed on the “rule of law” by policymakers in the context of development strategies. This shift can be attributed to two key factors:  the review of structural adjustment policies initiated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the 1980s, and  the advent of the post-Cold War era.

First, during the 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF came under mounting pressure as the structural adjustment programme was subjected to intense criticism for its inability to fulfil its primary objectives of promoting stability and reducing poverty. In order to elucidate this  unsatisfactory record of structural adjustment, the World Bank introduced the concept of "good governance". The World Bank maintained that structural adjustment remained the optimal long-term solution for developing countries, arguing that positive outcomes were frequently undermined by the inefficiency of poorly managed state institutions. In essence, the failure of developing countries was not due to the lack of liberalisation of markets, but rather to the shortcomings of governance. In response, the World Bank has advanced the objective of “good governance” as a means of addressing development challenges. The objective of good governance is to establish a political framework that facilitates the functioning of market economies through the promotion of transparency, the rule of law, and the implementation of accountable decision-making processes. The 1997 World Development Report, entitled The State in a Changing World [1], signalled a shift in the way aid was provided, prompting a rethink of the role of the state, both domestically and internationally. 

Concurrently, donors – that is, providers of development assistance – commenced the provision of substantial support  to facilitate regime transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the countries of the former Soviet Union and other developing countries following the end of the Cold War. These donors include multilateral organisations such as the World Bank or UN agencies, national development agencies such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It was widely acknowledged that the rule of law played a key role in  transitioning from a planned economy to a market economy, as well as the shift towards a democratic regime during the 1990s. 

Since then, there has been a significant increase in the provision of development assistance for legal reform projects in developing and transitioning countries. A considerable amount of financial investment has been made in these projects, amounting to billions of dollars. In the words of the United Nations General Assembly, “the advancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedom.”[2] In  recent developments, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed this guidance by including the "rule of law" as one of the goals (16.3) of its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.[3]

(2) The “Legalization” of  International Development Since the 1990s

The changing dynamics of international politics –marked by the end of the Cold War, the deepening of globalisation, the internationalisation of human rights, and the rise of the new institutionalism as the predominant development paradigm –have given rise to a focus on rule of law as a solution to various development issues during the 1990s. This phenomenon can be termed as the "legalization" of international development, a process that has persisted to the present.[4] The rule of law has been advanced as a potential solution to a variety of developmental issues, including the achievement of economic outcomes through the facilitation of economic growth and poverty reduction, the promotion of good governance through the constraints imposed on government and the support of democracy, the advancement of justice through  focus on the legal system and the addressing of human rights, the promotion of peace and security through the monopolisation of violence and its  association with law and order, and the regulation of environmental, agricultural and health outcomes.[5]

The development projects designed to achieve these objectives are even more extensive in scope. They encompass activities related to constitution-making and legislative reform, administrative reform, including the rationalisation of government budgets and the harmonisation of legal systems, and the reform of the judiciary and law enforcement, as well as the more expansive security sector, including the military and immigration. Moreover, the development projects provide assistance to law schools, bar associations, legal aid clinics and alternative dispute resolution processes. In addition, professional training and civic education are offered. The development projects also have the objective of raising public awareness more generally.[6]

In the discussion of rule of law initiatives, there is a tendency to prioritise technical assistance. However, when viewing  rule of law initiatives as a mediating factor in development influenced by legal changes, the methods employed are not confined to technical assistance. In certain instances, rule of law initiatives are incorporated within the provision of financial assistance, manifesting as loans. As Matsuo observes, “hard infrastructure (ports, roads, railways, dams, etc.) and the soft infrastructure (legal systems, etc.) that operates and manages it are inseparable”.[7]

In addition, the policy reform requirements that the World Bank and the IMF attach to their loans, known as conditionality, and JICA's guidelines for environmental and social considerations and loan procurement, also directly or indirectly encourage or force changes in recipient countries' legal systems. Furthermore, in terms of their indirect role, or perceived role, in promoting changes in the legal systems of certain countries, indicators such as the standards and guidelines of international organisations and industry groups, the World Bank's “Doing Business” and “Worldwide Governance Indicators” and the “Corruption Perceptions Index” of the international NGO Transparency International cannot be overlooked. The "Doing Business" initiative has been observed to function in conjunction with the World Bank's conditionalities, whether directly or indirectly. This has resulted in the instigation of reforms to the legal systems of recipient countries' business environments that the World Bank deems desirable. Moreover, when these indicators are employed as evaluation indicators for development assistance programmes and projects, the elements that constitute these indicators become the targets for enhancement through these programmes and projects.[8]

(3) Who are the Donors for Rule of Law Projects?

The principal actors, who have gained renown in other areas of development, including multilateral organisations such as the UN agencies, the World Bank, and the European Commission, as well as national development agencies, most notably the USAID, have all demonstrated their support for rule of law projects or initiatives. Whilst these entities are considered to represent the most prominent actors in the global promotion of rule of law, it should be noted that there are a multitude of other stakeholders involved, including international and national non-governmental organisations, bar associations, academics, and intermediaries. 

Recent trends, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), have seen the establishment of rules and enforcement mechanisms for addressing development issues through entities or platforms that transcend the traditional framework of donor and recipient countries. This growing trend is characterised by “multilateral law-making through legal development support”, involving various international organisations, national governments, businesses, NGOs and other actors in diverse ways.[9] This concept of law-making involving multiple actors is also evident in the EITI rules, which is a  non-binding soft law. This  approach to development issues through soft law can also be cited as a recent trend in  rule of law projects.[10]

In view of the fact that the nature of legal and political discourse is subject to evolution, it would be prudent to maintain flexibility in defining the concept of the rule of law in terms of strategy. This approach would facilitate its use by donors.

Fuller's enumeration of the requirements of the rule of law is currently the most widely accepted among legal theorists and practitioners of       rule of law projects. In accordance with his relatively minimalist interpretation of the rule of law, the law must possess a minimum degree of generality in relation to the individuals and circumstances to which they are applied (generality). Furthermore, they must be formally proclaimed in order for awareness to spread to those whose conduct the rule seeks to regulate  (public promulgation). Additionally, the law must be prospective, or such legislation must be non-retroactive (prohibitions against retroactivity), clearly and precisely worded (clarity), coherent with other legislation (prohibitions against contradictions), enabling of its own observance (prohibitions against requiring the impossible), imbued with a degree of stability that allows citizens to know it (stability over time), and applied and obeyed by the public authority (consistency between the rules and the actual conduct of legal actors).[11]

This conception of the rule of law, termed "formal legality" by Tamanaha in his book On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, is devoid of any substantive content requirements. Consequently, while it is rendered open to a range of ends in academic discussion, as Tamanaha noted[12], it enables donors to utilise the rule of law for their own ends. For example, the UN system understands the rule of law to include international human rights norms and standards along with formal legality.[13]

Although the World Bank does not explicitly define the rule of law as the UN does, its usage of the term appears to correspond to "formal legality". The rule of law is one of the dimensions of governance in the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank. Within the "Rule of Law" section of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the World Bank incorporates a number of indicators designed to measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and adhere to the established rules. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. The composite nature of these indicators enables a comprehensive measurement of a society's success in cultivating an environment where fair and predictable rules underpin economic and social interactions, and, crucially, the extent to which property rights are safeguarded.[14]

It is important to acknowledge the observation made by Tamanaha that the concept of the rule of law in the sense of “formal legality” is not necessarily incompatible with authoritarian or non-democratic systems of governance.[15]

 

2.     Ideas Underpinning  Rule of Law Projects

(1)  Development in Economics

In the 1980s, as neoliberalism based on neoclassical economics became the dominant development paradigm, and as the public finances of developing countries deteriorated and their accumulated debt problems worsened, the World Bank and the IMF promoted structural adjustment policies. These consisted of market liberalisation and government deregulation, and were designed to restore fiscal and balance of payments health. However, these policies have not only failed to deliver the expected results, but they have also contributed to the further impoverishment of the poor, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, leading to a widening gap between the rich and the poor. In response to mounting criticism of structural adjustment policies, the World Bank and other donors, drawing upon New Institutional Economics (NIE), which underscores the pivotal role of institutions in a market economy, began to acknowledge the significance of institutions and governance, encompassing legal frameworks, in development. Since the 1990s, they have reassessed the function of the state in facilitating institutional and governance reform.

(2)  Human Rights

Since the 1990s, the notion that development encompasses respect for human rights has gained widespread acceptance among mainstream development agencies, particularly those under the United Nations' mandate. This notion is encapsulated in Amartya Sen's seminal concept of "development as freedom".

It is evident that UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), adopt a human rights-based approach when it comes to the design and execution of development programmes and projects. This commitment to human rights is further exemplified by the inclusion of legal reform as a component of these initiatives. The United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework observes that the human rights-based approach to development constitutes a conceptual framework for sustainable development processes, which is normatively based on international human rights standards and principles that function to promote and protect human rights. Accordingly, under this approach, development plans, policies and processes are to be founded on a system of international law's rights and obligations, including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, as well as the right to development. This approach seeks to ensure that the human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination, participation and accountability guide UN development cooperation, with a focus on enhancing the capacity of duty bearers to fulfil their obligations and rights holders to claim their rights.[16]

(3)  Intersection between Security and Development

The prevailing geopolitical climate of the 1990s witnessed the transformation of conventional security institutions, as evidenced by the accelerated augmentation of UN peacekeeping operations and NATO's intervention in the Balkans. In this context, the concepts of peacebuilding and the security–development nexus first emerged. This interest in the security–development nexus is largely informed by a "human security" perspective and was primarily focused on addressing the dual challenges of security and development in conflict-affected countries. Consequently, there has been a substantial enhancement in the understanding of the comprehensive array of developmental factors that contribute to the initiation, duration, and cessation of violent conflicts. In response to this challenge, development practitioners and policy-makers initiated a number of new programmes and projects with the aim of promoting peace. Among these initiatives were programmes and projects focusing on the rule of law and reform of the security sector. Nevertheless, a more detailed examination of international agendas, financial commitments, and institutional transformations during the 1990s reveals that the security–development nexus was largely aspirational rather than tangible. [17]

The terrorist attacks on  9/11 had an immediate and profound effect on the emerging concept of the security-development nexus. The repercussions of 9/11 did not, however, serve  as a reinforcement of the interconnectedness between security and development; rather, they worked  to "securitise" development. This phenomenon can be observed in the growing tendency of donors to justify aid on the basis of national or international security concerns. Donors are increasingly directing      higher levels of assistance towards specific countries and sectors based on security imperatives. Security actors, such as military forces, are also engaged in the delivery of significant aid. Furthermore, donor governments are establishing new institutional units within their aid agencies or interdepartmental coordination mechanisms based on security-related motives.[18]

The 1990s saw the establishment of conflict prevention and peacebuilding agendas, which were motivated by the imperative to address intractable developmental challenges in conflict-affected countries, with the overarching objective being to enhance stability and security within these countries. A central aim of these agendas was also to prevent the regional and international propagation of such issues. Following the events on 9/11, there was a major shift in the relationship between security and development. These two concepts were redefined as a key part of a new strategy to stabilise and build conflict affected countries, leading to the introduction of a robust security agenda. The concept of state-building was identified as a primary concern at the intersection of security and development. However, the particulars of the requirements necessary in the process of state-building remained undetermined, provided that it was recognised that effective statehood required legitimacy as well as the capacity to govern. Those engaged in the processes of security and development approached the newly emerging agenda of state-building from disparate perspectives and with divergent agendas. [19 ]

The World Bank's publication of the 2011 World Development Report, entitled Conflict, Security, and Development [20], represented a significant turning point in the sense that it affirmed the relationship between security and development. Furthermore, it was recognised that effective statehood required legitimacy as well as the capacity to govern for conflict prevention. There is also a growing awareness that the contemporary phenomenon of terrorism and violent extremism thrives in contexts characterised by socio-economic marginalisation and political exclusion. 

The prevailing view among mainstream donors, including UN agencies, the World Bank, and Western multilateral and bilateral organisations, is that liberal democracy and a capitalist economy (market economy) are key drivers of development. The necessity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding as a collective agenda for security and development analysts and actors hinges upon the viability of the concept of global interdependence and global governance. The supposition that liberal democracy is a prerequisite for development is predicated on the assumption that the notion of rule of law does not tolerate human rights abuses. This therefore reflects a commitment to good governance and liberal democracy.

3.     Challenges

Since approximately the early 2010s onwards, the emergence of counter-discourses that challenge the promotion of rule of law, reflecting liberal democracy, has been observed. Some donors from emerging economies, for example China, have been vocal in their insistence that external actors should not interfere in the internal affairs, including human rights abuses, of foreign states. Furthermore, the Chinese government has expressed criticism of Western human rights conditionality and the promotion of the rule of law in a Western sense in the context of development cooperation.[21]Samuli Seppänen's analysis of Chinese foreign policy, which is oriented towards resisting international standards on human rights and the rule of law imposed by Western countries, and of elements of legal assistance in its foreign aid, suggests that Chinese legal development assistance offers an opportunity for the Chinese government. This assistance, according to Seppänen, could be used by the Chinese government to “try and convince elites in developing countries of the legitimacy of the Chinese approach to the rule of law and human rights”. Furthermore, it could allow “the Chinese government to provide concrete support for other authoritarian governments by disseminating information about the Chinese uses of law to suppress its dissidents”.[22]

The international human rights regime, for instance the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), is increasingly being influenced by authoritarian countries in order to advance their illiberal agendas. It has been argued that China is collaborating with authoritarian governments and developing countries that have divergent state interests but share a common disdain for human rights scrutiny.[23]
 

4.     Japanese ODA and the Rule of Law Projects: Legal Technical Assistance as a Pragmatic Approach

JICA implements rule of law projects, designated as "legal technical assistance," in developing countries, with a particular emphasis on the so-called transitional?      Asian countries. The objective of these projects is to assist these nations in establishing their own legal and judicial systems, as well as in the maintenance and enhancement of these systems. JICA's legal technical assistance is focused on three key areas: “making and improving rules”, “improving the performance of organisations that administer the law” (e.g. administrative authorities, courts and prosecutors' offices), and “improving access to justice”. The overarching goal of these efforts is to create an environment in which the general public can more easily utilise legal resources. The overarching objective of this legal development support is to actualise the rule of law in developing countries through these endeavours.[24]

Legal technical assistance, which is  funded by the Japanese ODA, adopts a cautious approach, endeavouring to avoid any interference in the internal affairs of the recipient countries. It is of the utmost importance to emphasise the ownership of the recipient countries. While the legal systems of Japan and other advanced economies have been introduced to the legal professionals of the recipient country, they have not been imposed. This has encouraged the legal professionals of the recipient country to select legal systems that will remain firmly embedded within the country for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, there has been a reluctance to publicly advocate for human rights and liberal democracy. Instead, the focus of legal technical assistance has been on the domain of law for market economies (e.g., the Civil Code). In instances where support was provided for areas of law pertaining to human rights and democracy, it was emphasised that the objective was to facilitate the development of a market economy and business environment (e.g., the Administrative Procedure Law).

The approach adopted by Japan’s legal technical assistance is predicated on three factors. Firstly, there is the recognition of the historical and cultural context of the recipient country. Secondly, there is the creation of a legal system that is aligned with the national identity of the country in question. Thirdly, and finally, there is the active involvement of the populace in the utilisation of these laws. Japan's historical context has significantly influenced the adoption of this approach by Japan's legal technical assistance. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has engaged in the process of legal transplant from the "advanced" countries of Europe and the US. In this process, Japan has adapted and adopted from several country’s systems in a manner that aligns with the needs and characteristics of its own society. This experience has led Japanese lawyers to conclude that the imposition of advanced laws from outsiders is an ineffective method for fostering their acceptance in other countries. Instead, the most crucial element is for the people of these countries themselves to engage in the process of learning and developing laws that align with their societal needs and norms.

Despite the evident reluctance of legal technical assistance to publicly advocate for human rights and liberal democracy, and to criticise human rights violations in other countries, it cannot be concluded that the JICA's projects do not support human rights or liberal democracy. Indeed, there is observable engagement with issues of human rights violations, without explicitly naming these as such. Instead, Japan utilises a multifaceted approach encompassing the promotion of universal health coverage (UHC) and human security. The overarching principle of the Development Cooperation Charter is the promotion of human security. The Development Cooperation Charter states the following:

“The concept of human security, which promotes building nations and communities that enable each individual to live happily and with dignity, free from fear and want, is fundamental to what Japan should be, that is, to embody the noble ideals and principles of humanity, and is consistent with the values of freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. Japan will continue to position human security as a guiding principle that underlies all of its development cooperation”. [25]

However, it is important to note that the JICA’s projects do not overtly categorise these concerns as human rights violations or explicitly advocate for human rights and liberal democracy.

It is notable that the Japanese ODA has provided substantial support to the security sector, primarily through multilateral organisations. A case in point is the “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan”.[26]
 

It is argued that, while refraining from criticism of interference in internal affairs and imposition, Japan is trying to approach the issue of human rights and democracy in an indirect and pragmatic way. Conducting  rule of law projects in forms of legal technical assistance in the field of commercial law is another example of such an indirect and pragmatic approach. The promotion of the rule of law, a field in which global initiatives have been developed for over 30 years since the end of the Cold War, is currently facing the challenge of counter-discourse. In this context, a pragmatic approach, as exemplified by Japan, which avoids the challenge of counter-discourse, may be more realistic in supporting human rights and liberal democracy in the Global South as a development aid strategy.

＊This paper constitutes a revised version of the report delivered at the international seminar "Japan and Changing Security Environment Asia", held at the National University of Mongolia on 4 November 2024. The seminar was organised as a series of academic activities by the International Study Group on Security Cooperation Mechanisms, which is an initiative of ROLES. I would like to express my gratitude to the commentators and participants at the conference for their constructive feedback. I acknowledge that the responsibility for any errors lies solely with myself.

[1] The World Bank, World Development Report: The State in a Changing World, accessed February 4, 2025, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/518341468315316376/pdf/173000REPLACEMENT0WDR01997.pdf.
[2] United Nations General Assembly, The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, A/RES/61/39, 4 December 2006, accessed January 25, 2025,   https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/588185?v=pdf.
[3] United Nations General Assembly, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015, accessed January 25, 2025, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf.
[4] In response to the practice of law and development that has developed on a large scale, a significant number of research works in law and development have been produced in the English-speaking world alone. Rooij and Nicholson refer to this phenomenon as the "inflationary trend in law and development". Benjamin Van Rooij and Pip Nicholson, “Inflationary Trends in Law and Development,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 24 (Winter 2013).
[5] See Shane Chalmers, “The Rule of Law and International Development,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Law and Development, eds. Ruth Buchanan, Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 97, Kindle.
[6] For a comprehensive overview of the range of projects, see Chalmers, 97.
[7] See Hiroshi Matsuo, Good Governance and the Rule of Law: The Challenge for Law and Development Studies (Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron sha, 2009 [Japanese]), 109.
[8] For different methods of rule of law projects, see Naoko Kuwahara, “The Rule of Law Projects for ‘Poverty’ Reduction: Human Rights-Based Approach and Market Economy Catalyst Approach,” in Rule of Law Projects in Asia, eds. Masanori Aikyo, Yuzuru Shimada and Naoko Kuwahara (Tokyo: Junpo sya, 2021 [Japanese]), 74, 5.
[9] See Hiroshi Matsuo, “Globalisation and Development Law: The Response of Law to Multilateral Legal Formation,” in Globalization and the Transformation of Law, eds. Hajime Yamamoto, Mika Yokoyama and Kanako Takayama (Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron sha, 2018 [Japanese]), 163.
[10]On the recent trend of non-traditional style actors and soft lawmaking, see Kuwahara, 75.
[11] See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969), 33-94, Kindle.
[12] See Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), “The emphasis of formal legality” of chapter 7, Kindle.
[13] It is stated that: "[f]or the United Nations (UN) system, the rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency." United Nations and the Rule of Law, “What is the Rule of Law”, accessed January 25, 2025, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/.
[14] World Bank Group, Worldwide Governance Indicators, accessed January 25, 2025, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.
[15] See Tamanaha, “Three themes” of chapter 9.
[16] United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework; Internal Guidance, edited version of 3 June 2019, 13, accessed January 25, 2025, https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/UN%20Cooperation%20Framework%20Internal%20Guidance%20--%201%20June%202022.pdf.
[17] On the link between security and development after the end of the Cold War, see Necla Tschirgi, “International Security and Development,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Security, eds. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 563-5, Kindle.
[18] On securitising foreign aid following 9/11, see Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt, “Security, Development and the Securitization of Foreign Aid,” in The Securitization of Foreign Aid, eds. Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt (Hampshire, England and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Kindle.
[19] On the reconceptualisation of the relationship between development and security after 9/11 and the emergence of the state-building agenda as its central priority, see Tschirgi, 565-8.
[20]The World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, accessed February 4, 2025,
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/806531468161369474/pdf/622550PUB0WDR0000public00BOX361476B.pdf.
[21] See Samuli Seppänen, “Chinese Legal Development Assistance: Which Rule of Law? Whose Pragmatism?,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 51 (January 2018), Samuli Seppänen, “Production and Global Dissemination of Chinese Legal Ideology: Implications for the Study of Illiberalism,” Cardozo International & Comparative Law Review 6 (Spring 2023).
[22] See Seppänen, “Chinese Legal Development Assistance”, 148, 9.
[23] See Yu-Jie Chen, "‘Authoritarian International Law’ in Action? Tribal Politics in the Human Rights Council,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 54 (November 2021), Yu-Jie Chen, (2019), “China's Challenge to the International Human Rights Regime,” New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 51 (Summer 2019).
[24] On JICA’s legal technical assistance, see JICA ed., Japanese-style “Law Making” that Change the World (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2018, [Japanese]).
[25]Development Cooperation Charter, 5, accessed January 25, 2025, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page24e_000410.html.
[26] The Japanese government has been a major contributor to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, particularly in the area of payroll management. See UNDP, “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA)-Support to Payroll Management,” accessed January 25, 2025, https://open.undp.org/projects/00089137.