[ROLES Commentary No.42] (Japanese version)

On February 8, 2024, the foreign ministries of the Baltic states made an announcement celebrating their new independence from Moscow. After more than 15 years of effort and time, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have long been part of the former Soviet-style power network and have sometimes been threatened by Moscow with energy blackmail, have finally succeeded in cutting themselves off from the Moscow-centric power grid. Having confirmed that the three countries alone can maintain an adequate power supply, they then completed their connection (or frequency synchronisation) to the European grid at 14:05 on February 9.

   This article outlines the energy security of the Baltic States, with a particular focus on power issues, the implications of the recent disruption of the Baltic Sea submarine cables, and political conflicts over green energy.[i]

 

The Baltic states were the first European countries to reject Russian oil and natural gas. Both diplomatic practitioners and academics have long paid attention to their energy security.[ii] The infrastructure and logistics for electricity and heat supply relied on the network established during the Soviet 50-year occupation. This made it easy for Russia to weaponise its energy on the Baltic states, and it made it difficult for the Baltic countries to achieve independence from that Moscow-centric network.

   For nearly two decades, the three countries gradually moved away from this dependence on Russia. The conflict in 2014 accelerated the pace, and since the war in Ukraine in 2022, they have achieved 0% dependence on fossil fuels such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is in contrast to, for example, Schröder-Merkel-era Germany, which (ignoring strong resistance and admonitions from the Baltic states and some Nordic countries) chose to install two pipelines to Russia and to submit itself peacefully to its cheap natural gas.[iii] The Baltic states were a noteworthy case of promoting an energy security strategy that did not fall prey to such “economic rationality.

   As is well known, the number one diplomatic priority of the Baltic states has been to maintain their independence against the threat from Moscow. The process has not been smooth. After the restoration of independence in 1990-1, the first problem was the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in the Baltic States, but they achieved it. The path to EU membership was not easy, and the path to NATO membership was more difficult, but they achieved it. For the Baltic states, which have gradually loosened their political and economic control from Moscow, the one thing they could not eliminate until the end was their energy dependence.

  Although the Baltic countries succeeded in overcoming their dependence on Russia for natural gas by diversifying imports and establishing large-scale LNG terminals, they were unable to achieve independence in terms of their electric power networks until the very end. The Baltic countries were once under the occupation of the former Soviet Union, and their electric power infrastructure and networks depended on those of the Soviet era. For this reason, even after regaining independence, the Baltic states connected with the former Soviet power grid (IPS/UPS) based on the BRELL agreement; thus, Moscow controlled their frequency network.

   Until 2009, the Baltic country's dependence on electricity from Russia had been kept in check by Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant. However, because the plant was the same as the Chornobyl-type RBMK(LWGR) plant that caused the accident, it had to be decommissioned by 2009 as a condition of EU membership (initially until 2004, but a five-year extension was granted for one of the two operating reactors). A subsequent plan to build a new nuclear power plant (Visaginas) was well underway, even after the nuclear accident in Japan, but a surprise anti-nuclear campaign just before the 2012 advisory referendum resulted in a narrow majority against the project and set it back. The Baltic countries' dependence on Russia for electricity became even more substantial. Russia supported the anti-nuclear campaign.[iv]

Figure 1: Five presidents celebrate disconnection from BRELL on February 9, 2025

Source: Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania official photos

 

It was in 2007 that the Baltic countries decided to leave BRELL for the long term. Since then, three republics have been steadily working on what must be done to achieve this exit for many years. It was “not just a technical project, but above all a strategic project to reduce geopolitical risks”.[v]

   First, each country has strengthened its production capacity of so-called new energy sources, such as wind, solar (photovoltaic), biomass, etc., to augment its power sources that do not require Russian electricity or LNG (Figure 2). Although this appears at first glance to anticipate a shift to green power sources, the reality is largely in the context of breaking away from energy dependence on Russia. There have been plans to introduce small nuclear power plants in recent years.

 

Fig 2. The energy mix of the Baltic States

Source: Made by the author based on IEA data (2023).

 

The Baltic States also reinforced the power connection network among the Baltic countries and have been installing storage battery stations to ensure stable response in the event of power shortages. In addition, they have been installing more connection cables with neighbouring countries. At present, there are four power connections: two with Finland, EstLink 1 (completed in 2006) and Estlink 2 (2014); with Sweden, NordBalt (2015); and with Poland, LitPol (2015). However, one of these, Estlink 2, was recently disrupted by a suspicious vessel and is currently dysfunction (see details below).

   The Baltic and Polish transmission system operators (TSO) drove the move to leave BRELL and synchronise it with the European power grid (UCTE grid). The EU also provided subsidies for this purpose. All governments acted cooperatively and coordinatedly, and Lithuania, in particular, took a leadership role. Lithuania is home to NATO's Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSEC-COE), which also plays a leading role in energy security throughout the Western alliance.

   The reasons for Lithuania's particular aggressiveness are complex. Originally, Lithuania was more competitive with Russia in terms of energy policy than Estonia and Latvia for various reasons, including differences in party politics, business sectors, and the percentage of Russian-speaking residents.[vi] Estonia has thermal power generation capacity from their rich oil shales, which can be abundant in the country when needed, and Latvia has a significant hydroelectric power generation capacity. In contrast, Lithuania has not had such capacity since it discontinued nuclear power generation. The additional costs required to achieve synchronisation with Europe were also higher in Estonia and Latvia.

 

Fig 3. Schematic of the Baltic States' Preparations for Synchronization to Europe

Source: ENTSO-E

The disconnection proceeded sequentially from about 6 am. and was completed at 9:09 a.m. local time on August 8, with the last disconnection in Narva, Estonia. During this time, the presidents of the Baltic States and Poland, as well as the European Commission (Von der Leyen), gathered in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, to celebrate the moment.[vii] Former Lithuanian Prime Minister and European Defense Commissioner Kubilius and European Energy Commissioner Jørgensen were also present. On February 8-9, 2025, a ceremony was also held in Vilnius to celebrate the Baltic States' another independence from Russia and their synchronisation with Europe.[viii]

   The successful disconnection from the BRELL grid and the synchronisation into Europe were not celebrated in a frenzied manner in the streets, but they were well understood and accepted by society. The three country TSOs (Elering [Estonia], AST [Latvia], and Litgrid [Lithuania]) spent years publicising the “Baltic Synchro” and even held a countdown in the same format just prior to the event.

   The author was in Estonia and Latvia immediately after the synchronisation. There was no visible festive mood on the streets, and it was difficult for the uninformed tourist to understand that such a historical achievement was happening behind the scenes at first glance[ix]. However, it was reported many times in the news and on the front page, and it was well recognised socially, so much so that even in small conversations with ordinary citizens, no one knew about it.

   For example, Estonia's significant newspapers, Postimees and Maaleht, touched on the topic before and after February 8, using full-page spreads to introduce the response and implementation process. After the transition, Latvia's most popular discussion program, Kas notiek Latvijā?, dealt with energy issues in its first program.[x]

 

Fig 4. Estonian local newspaper reporting regarding disconnection from the Russian power grid.

Source: Photo taken by the author

 

This smooth switchover was not only a technical but also a political success: after the Baltic states decided in the fall of 2024 to leave BRELL in February 2025, dis/misinformation attempts were often deployed on social networking sites to sabotage the decision. In particular, they propagated falsehoods such as the risk of power outages and equipment damage and that prices would rise more than tenfold because they would no longer be able to buy cheap Russian electricity (as usual, TikTok was the central stage of these attempts).

   As for prices, the Baltic countries cut off all electricity trade with Russia and Belarus in early summer of 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine, so price fluctuations could not be caused by the breakaway from BRELL itself (the cost of infrastructure development have been already added to the electricity bill). This move should be viewed cautiously because the anti-nuclear campaign in Lithuania in 2012 was driven by such a discourse of “high electricity prices,” which unexpectedly led to a majority of opposition. The mainstream media and fact-checking NGOs responded by enthusiastically disseminating dismissed concerns and debunking disinformation.[xi]

   Government authorities and power transmission companies in various countries have deployed security forces to substations and other power-related facilities, wary of cyber and physical attacks (especially drone attacks) that could be disguised as accidents. Since Estlink2 connecting Estonia and Finland had already been destroyed by the Russian shadow fleet in December 2024, it was easy to assume that similar sabotage would again occur on land. These careful and multiple measures resulted in a smooth transition.

 

Fig 5. Moment of power disconnection and personnel defending infrastructure in Estonia

Source: Postimees/Sander Ilvest, Postimees/Mihkel Maripuu

Effects of Subsea Power Cable Disruption

In fact, electricity prices in the Baltic countries have skyrocketed in recent months: in February 2025, they were almost double what they were a year earlier and the highest in Europe. Prices vary from day to day but generally exceed 150 euros per MWh, and on February 15, they rose to 266 euros per MWh.

   The reasons are complex. First, as a general rule, electricity demand increases in the winter, raising prices. In addition, there was little wind in the Baltic Sea this winter, preventing wind power generation.

   Another major factor, however, is the aforementioned breakage of the subsea power cable connecting Estonia and Finland (Estlink 2). If the connection to the neighbouring countries is disrupted, trading surplus electricity through it will be constrained, making it difficult for the mechanism to suppress electricity prices to work. The impact varies from analyst to analyst but appears to be a 10% to 40% price increase.[xii] The surge in electricity prices began with the cables' breakage before the BRELL grid's disconnection (Figure 6).

 

Fig 6. Trends in electricity prices in the Baltic countries (EUR/MWh)

Note: The solid line is the value of the 7-day moving average

Source: Made by the author from Ember-energy data.

 

Fortunately, few have falsely blamed the disconnection from the Russian electricity network for the surge in electricity prices. Despite public opinion supporting this disconnection while some opposed it,[xiii] the disconnection has not been scapegoated for energy price hikes. This suggests that a well-informed public has influenced the narrative. Instead, public opinion has broadly accepted that the price increases are due to transmission capacity, weather conditions, production capacity and primary fuel prices.

   Concerns about the destruction of submarine cables and their adverse effects are not a one-time occurrence. As reported worldwide (including Japan), more than 10 submarine cables in the Baltic Sea, including optical communication cables, have been damaged since October 2023. One of them is the EstLink2 above. There is no guarantee that the remaining subsea power cables, EstLink-1 and NordBalt, will not be targeted. Russia repeatedly sabotaged the construction of the NordBalt subsea power cable in 2014. 

   For years, some analysts had predicted that Russian sabotage of submarine cables, in the context of BRELL disconnection, was possible.[xiv] Now that the former concern has become a real threat, NATO has launched Operation Baltic Sentry, and the Lithuanian Navy is also strengthening the protection of the NordBalt cable.[xv]

   There are plans for further expansion of submarine power cables, including Estlink 3 connecting Estonia and Finland and the Harmony Link project connecting Lithuania and Poland via the Baltic Sea. The latter, however, is scheduled to switch to a land-based connection in consideration of a succession of cable disruptions.

 

The fact that there has been little criticism of the disconnection from the Russian power grid does not mean that energy politics, including electricity prices, are not an issue in the Baltic States. Politics on these topics have become increasingly confrontational in recent years. The problem is the balance between electricity prices, environmental impact, and energy security. In general, it is said that it is difficult to achieve the three E's of Energy Security, Environment, and Equity (in short, low electricity prices) at the same time, and this has always been discussed in the Baltic region.[xvi]

   In Estonia and Latvia, the debate and arguments have reached a fever pitch, mainly over wind power generation. This is because both countries will hold local elections this year. The installation of wind farms has a large and vivid impact on local life, such as local employment, confiscation and damage to farmland and forests, and subsidies for guarantees, making it even the most important issue in local elections. Moreover, this is not just a topic of one particular region but a nationwide phenomenon now.

   In Estonia, for example, a no-confidence motion was submitted to the cabinet over the green energy strategy (it was rejected, though).[xvii] Assuming that energy independence from Russia is an unquestionable premise, the issue seems to be balancing appropriate prices and reducing environmental burdens. In addition to the burden on rural areas and other environmental burdens that would be incurred in increasing wind power generation, which has become a significant source of partisan conflict, the situation has become very contentious because the subsidies are being misused.

   Something similar is happening in Latvia. Plans to build many wind farms in the country have been approved without restraint and are excessive. In addition to criticism of the lack of a nationwide strategy, the issues of local guarantees and the unfairness that wind power is the only exception to conventional environmental regulations are also points of contention.

   The shift to greener sources of electricity also includes another argument: dependence on China. For wind power, China dominates the supply chain for the air turbines. Of course, there are also non-Chinese companies; for example, many wind turbines in the Baltic countries are produced in Germany, but they are ultimately dependent on China for mining the resources (e.g. neodymium) needed for the magnets that play a critical role in their wind turbines. The same is valid for photovoltaic power generation, which is increasingly used after wind power (e.g., silicon production and gallium mining).

   As is well known, the Baltic countries have been particularly vigilant toward China among Central and Eastern European countries. Still, this issue of shifting to green energy and dependence on China has not become a topic of broad social discussion, although some experts recognise it.[xviii] The EU has begun investigating the possibility of unfair subsidies by China and taking measures such as excluding Chinese manufacturers from subsidies for new energy. This last point is a strategic issue shared by the Baltic countries and Europe and free East Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.[xix]

 

Now, “the era of Russian energy manipulation is over” (Lithuanian Foreign Minister Budrys)[xx] as the BRELL disconnection and synchronisation to Europe has been successfully achieved. However, this does not mean that the risk has wholly disappeared. As has already been seen, a break in the Baltic Sea submarine cable can affect the price of electricity even if it cannot jeopardise the supply itself.

   Currently, in the domestic politics of the Baltic countries, the surge in electricity prices based on submarine cable breakage has not directly led to anti-government actions or social destabilisation. However, there is no guarantee that this will be the case in future too. The energy dispute has often been a point of contention in the domestic politics of the Baltic States, and it is more than possible that it will be repeated. The current situation could lead to concerns about the EU, which is proceeding with a green transition. Given the current situation in the Baltic Sea, where submarine cables have been unnaturally damaged one after another, it is undeniable that another “accident” could occur in another submarine power cable.

   The green transition underway in this context also hides the possibility of dependence on China in terms of technology and resources, which will also be a point of contention in the long term. Lithuania already banned Chinese companies' remote access to the country's solar/wind power plants. While it is virtually impossible to proceed with green transitions without relying on Chinese resources and products in the short to medium term, their presence will be tolerated to as far as it ensure practical benefits while narrowing the room for undesirable influence to be exercised. Regarding the issue of submarine cable damage and the search for a relationship with China, there are similarities between the challenges faced by the Baltic States in Europe and those faced by Japan and Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. This would suggest the possibility of cooperation.

 

[i] About disconnection from BRELL and Synchronization to Europe, see Laura Tatarėlytė, 2025 “The era of Russian energy manipulations is over” Freidrich Nauman Foundation, 07.02.2025; Helmane, Inese (2023) “Ko nozīmē Baltijas valstu elektroapgādes sistēmas sinhronizācija ar Eiropas tīklu,” lvportals.lv, 05. septembrī, 2023.
[ii] Ex. Grigas, Agnia 2013 The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia, Ashgate; Balmaceda Margarita 2013 The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, elarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure, University of Toronto Press; Kalis, Michael ed. 2024 The Energy Trilemma in the Baltic Sea Region
Security, Equity and the Environment, Routledge.
[iii] Ex. Whist, Bendik S. (2008) “Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline. An Analysis of the Political Debates in the Baltic Sea Region Regarding the Planned Gas Pipeline from Russia to Germany” FNI Report 15/2008, 1-77; Quirico, Monica (2024) “The Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region: Environmental Challenges and the Controversy over Nord Stream 2” Baltic World, 17(3): 131-141.
[iv] Jermalavičius, Tomas et al. (2022) Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States? International Centre for Defense and Security.
[v] Karnau, Andrus (2025) “Taavi Veskimägi: kõige tähtsam oli elektrivõrgu lahutamisel poliitiline toetus” Postimees, 8. veebruar 2025, 13:37.
[vi] Grigas 2013 op.cit.
[vii] Ex. ERR (2025) “Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania disconnected from Russian power grid” err.ee, 08.02.2025 16:49; LRP (2025) Nausėda telefonu: goodbye Russia, goodbye Lenin, Delfi.lt 2025.02.10 12:06
[viii] European Comission (2025) “"Today, history is made." President von der Leyen on the synchronisation of the Baltic energy grids” Youtube.com Streamed live on Feb 9, 2025; Baltic Energy Independence Day” Youtube.com, Streamed live on Feb 10, 2025.
[ix] In Lithuania, there were some displays of objects and signs near the Energy Museum, which is located near theenter of the capital. As an aside, in terms of celebrations seen on the streets in Latvia, displays and objects praising the award-winning and Oscar-nominated animated film Straume from Latvia were more prominent.
[x] Fridrihsone, Madara (2025) “Vēja parku haoss, «rupjmaizes līmenītis» un neesošie starpsavienojumi: būtiskākais diskusijā par enerģētikas stratēģiju” Kas notiek Latvijā? LSM.lv, 16. februāris, 13:30.
[xi] Ex. Propastop (2025) “Baltics Cut the Cord: Russia Reacts to BRELL Exit” Propastop.org 11. Feb 2025; Siliņš, Ronalds , Annija Petrova, Re:Baltica/Re:Check “Latvija varētu saražot visu elektrību, bet tas būtu dārgi” re:baltica, 11. februāris, 2025.
[xii] Kovacs, Robert (2024) “EstLink 2 failure: no effect on security of supply but prices” CEEnergy News, December 30, 2024; ERR (2024) Electricity sellers: Broken undersea cable will lead to higher prices, ERR.ee, 31.12.2024 00:42; Baltic Wind (2025) Damage to EstLink 2 cable raises energy prices in Baltic countries, balticwind.eu, January 3rd, 2025.
[xiii] 900 Sekundes (2025) Aptauja: Puse iedzīvotāju pozitīvi vērtē atvienošanos no Krievijas energosistēmas, TV3, 6. februārī 7:46.
[xiv] ; Trakimavičius, Lukas (2021) The Hidden Threat to Baltic Undersea Power Cables, NATO ENSEC COE; Nakamura, Hotaka (2023) The Enemy Below: Fighting against Russia’s Hybrid Underwater Warfare​” Center for Martitime Strategy, June 29, 2023; Loik, Ramon (2024) “Undersea Hybrid Threats in Strategic Competition: The Emerging Domain of NATO–EU Defense Cooperation” Journal of Baltic Security, 10(2): 1-25
[xv] BNS (2025) “Lithuania’s Navy steps up NordBalt cable protection amid reports of damage attempts,” LRT.lt, 2025.01.14 09:20.
[xvi] Kalis (2024) op.cit.
[xvii] ERR (2025) “Opposition submits no-confidence motion against prime minister” ERR.ee, 11.02.2025 16:25.
[xviii] About China’s influence operations in the Baltic countries, including environmental aspects, see Nichols, Katherine, Sanda Svetoka, Edward Lucas, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Egle Klekere, Viking Bohman (2022) China’s Influence in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment: Latvia and Sweden, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence; Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Una Aleksandra, and Tanya Lim (2024) Climate- and Environmentally Based Information Activities by PRC and Russian Media, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
[xix] Cf Nakamura, Hiroko, Kan Sichao, Takahiro Nagata, Yoshiaki Shibata (2024) Challenges and solutions to deploying floating offshore win power in Japan, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan; Alkousaa, Riham, Christoph Steitz and Nina Chestney (2024) Chinese wind turbine-makers move into Europe as trade tensions flare, Reuters, July 19, 202410:12 PM GMT+9.
[xx] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (2025) Minister Budrys in Latvia: Baltic States are an Example of Energy Independence for Europe. MFA Lithuania, News 2025-01-09