1. Introduction
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, its immediate objective was regime change in Kyiv and forcing Ukraine back into Russian orbit. Regarding long-term strategic goals, President Putin has framed the war in Ukraine as a battle between Russia and the ʻcollective Westʼ, the first step in undoing the post-Cold War international order that has ignored Russiaʼs national interests and diminished its position in the world. In other words, as seen by Putin, his ultimate goal is to restore Russiaʼs ʻrightfulʼ place in the world by joining with the Global South to create a ʻtruly multipolar orderʼ in which numerous countries share power instead of one (the U.S.) dominating it.
There has been a growing perception worldwide that the liberal international order (LIO) is coming to an end. A powerful array of non-Western states seeks to weaken/transform the order, smaller states aim to exit the order while seeking alternative patrons, and Western right-wing networks look to subvert the order from within. Each of these factors interacts and reinforces each other. Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine was a watershed moment insofar that it has clearly exposed the fault lines between how the West views the global governance system it fashioned after World War II and how the rest of the world does. Indeed, what is most striking about Russiaʼs illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is that most of the world outside the West has shown little interest in punishing Russia for its transgressions, adopting instead a position of ʻstrategic non-alignment/strategic neutralityʼ.
On February 25, 2022, in a crucial UN Security Council (UNSC) vote on a resolution deploring the Russian invasion of Ukraine, India and the UAE decided to join China in abstaining, raising eyebrows in the West. Five days later, on March 2, despite 141 member states voting in favour of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution demanding that Russia unconditionally withdraw from Ukraine, the real news was that China, India, South Africa, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Iran were among 32 countries that abstained. As for the largest country in Latin America, although Brazil voted in favour of the March 2 resolution, on April 7 the same year, when the UNGA held a vote on a U.S.-initiated resolution to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Brazil abstained arguing that the resolution would politicize the UNHRC discussions and result in the ʻdisengagement of the relevant actorsʼ thus hindering ʻdialogue for peaceʼ.
At the time of writing a final draft, four years into the conflict, countries in the Global South, despite their long-standing adherence to the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, refuse to either condemn Moscowʼs invasion of Ukraine or join with the West in sanctioning and isolating Russia. Even more, the Westʼs call for a principled and unequivocal response to the aggression against Ukraine is seen as hypocritical. As Leonard aptly summarized: ʻThe Westʼs commitment to the principle of sovereignty in Ukraine rings somewhat hollow after years of Western drones patrolling the skies above Pakistan and Afghanistan. Werenʼt these the same countries that changed international borders in Kosovo, overthrew Muammar Qaddafi in Libya and invaded Iraq?ʼ The countries of the Global South view the Western-led LIO as a tool for promoting Western interests and perceive the war in Ukraine as primarily a European problem. It is thus not surprising that they have chosen to focus on protecting their own interests amid the economic and geopolitical upheaval caused by the war, while largely ignoring the Western narrative, which frames the conflict as a final battle between democracy and tyranny.
The overarching aim of this paper is to elucidate Chinaʼs strategic calculus in the Ukraine war within the wider context of a shifting global international order. The study is composed of five sections organized around key themes. Following the introduction, Section 2 examines Chinaʼs diplomatic response to the conflict, including Beijingʼs voting behaviour in UN fora, the incorporation of the concept of ʻindivisible securityʼ into its global security vision, and its opposition to unilateral sanctions against Russia. Section 3 explores Chinaʼs strategic narratives on the Russo-Ukrainian war, with a focus on Chinaʼs critical stance towards the U.S., NATO, and the EUʼs involvement in the conflict. Section 4 discusses Chinaʼs mediation efforts in the Ukraine conflict, such as the 2023 Peace Plan and the 2024 Six-point Consensus. Section 5 delves into Chinaʼs short, medium, and long-term strategic calculations in relation to the Russia-Ukraine war. In the short term, it discusses the rationale behind Chinaʼs assistance for Russiaʼs war effort. The medium-term analysis addresses the internationalization of the RMB to build financial market resilience, the sanction-proofing of the economy, and the revision of military strategy and tactics in light of a possible Taiwan contingency. In the long term, the section examines limitations of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and Chinaʼs pivot towards the Global South in the context of an emerging multilateral international order. The findings of the study will contribute to our understanding of the ongoing strategic competition between the U.S. and China.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, its immediate objective was regime change in Kyiv and forcing Ukraine back into Russian orbit. Regarding long-term strategic goals, President Putin has framed the war in Ukraine as a battle between Russia and the ʻcollective Westʼ, the first step in undoing the post-Cold War international order that has ignored Russiaʼs national interests and diminished its position in the world. In other words, as seen by Putin, his ultimate goal is to restore Russiaʼs ʻrightfulʼ place in the world by joining with the Global South to create a ʻtruly multipolar orderʼ in which numerous countries share power instead of one (the U.S.) dominating it.
There has been a growing perception worldwide that the liberal international order (LIO) is coming to an end. A powerful array of non-Western states seeks to weaken/transform the order, smaller states aim to exit the order while seeking alternative patrons, and Western right-wing networks look to subvert the order from within. Each of these factors interacts and reinforces each other. Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine was a watershed moment insofar that it has clearly exposed the fault lines between how the West views the global governance system it fashioned after World War II and how the rest of the world does. Indeed, what is most striking about Russiaʼs illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is that most of the world outside the West has shown little interest in punishing Russia for its transgressions, adopting instead a position of ʻstrategic non-alignment/strategic neutralityʼ.
On February 25, 2022, in a crucial UN Security Council (UNSC) vote on a resolution deploring the Russian invasion of Ukraine, India and the UAE decided to join China in abstaining, raising eyebrows in the West. Five days later, on March 2, despite 141 member states voting in favour of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution demanding that Russia unconditionally withdraw from Ukraine, the real news was that China, India, South Africa, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Iran were among 32 countries that abstained. As for the largest country in Latin America, although Brazil voted in favour of the March 2 resolution, on April 7 the same year, when the UNGA held a vote on a U.S.-initiated resolution to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Brazil abstained arguing that the resolution would politicize the UNHRC discussions and result in the ʻdisengagement of the relevant actorsʼ thus hindering ʻdialogue for peaceʼ.
At the time of writing a final draft, four years into the conflict, countries in the Global South, despite their long-standing adherence to the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, refuse to either condemn Moscowʼs invasion of Ukraine or join with the West in sanctioning and isolating Russia. Even more, the Westʼs call for a principled and unequivocal response to the aggression against Ukraine is seen as hypocritical. As Leonard aptly summarized: ʻThe Westʼs commitment to the principle of sovereignty in Ukraine rings somewhat hollow after years of Western drones patrolling the skies above Pakistan and Afghanistan. Werenʼt these the same countries that changed international borders in Kosovo, overthrew Muammar Qaddafi in Libya and invaded Iraq?ʼ The countries of the Global South view the Western-led LIO as a tool for promoting Western interests and perceive the war in Ukraine as primarily a European problem. It is thus not surprising that they have chosen to focus on protecting their own interests amid the economic and geopolitical upheaval caused by the war, while largely ignoring the Western narrative, which frames the conflict as a final battle between democracy and tyranny.
The overarching aim of this paper is to elucidate Chinaʼs strategic calculus in the Ukraine war within the wider context of a shifting global international order. The study is composed of five sections organized around key themes. Following the introduction, Section 2 examines Chinaʼs diplomatic response to the conflict, including Beijingʼs voting behaviour in UN fora, the incorporation of the concept of ʻindivisible securityʼ into its global security vision, and its opposition to unilateral sanctions against Russia. Section 3 explores Chinaʼs strategic narratives on the Russo-Ukrainian war, with a focus on Chinaʼs critical stance towards the U.S., NATO, and the EUʼs involvement in the conflict. Section 4 discusses Chinaʼs mediation efforts in the Ukraine conflict, such as the 2023 Peace Plan and the 2024 Six-point Consensus. Section 5 delves into Chinaʼs short, medium, and long-term strategic calculations in relation to the Russia-Ukraine war. In the short term, it discusses the rationale behind Chinaʼs assistance for Russiaʼs war effort. The medium-term analysis addresses the internationalization of the RMB to build financial market resilience, the sanction-proofing of the economy, and the revision of military strategy and tactics in light of a possible Taiwan contingency. In the long term, the section examines limitations of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and Chinaʼs pivot towards the Global South in the context of an emerging multilateral international order. The findings of the study will contribute to our understanding of the ongoing strategic competition between the U.S. and China.
研究会「広域中央アジアの重畳化する安全保障環境」