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2025 / 01 / 29 (水)

Mahfuz Kabir and Shanjida Shahab Uddin, "FOIP and BIG-B: Bangladesh in Perspective" (ROLES Commentary No. 37)

1. Introduction

Bangladesh has evolved into a notable success in socio-economic development over the past decades, transforming from a low-income nation to a dynamic rising economy. The country has achieved continuous GDP growth yearly in recent years (Beyer and Wacker, 2023), leading to notable advancements in poverty alleviation, education, healthcare, and gender equality. Primary factors contributing to this advancement encompass the flourishing ready-made garment (RMG) sector, remittances from a substantial diaspora, and vigorous public and private sector efforts in infrastructure and technology (Mahmood, 2023). However, challenges continue to arise as elevated commodity prices and concurrent global monetary policy tightening following Russia's invasion of Ukraine have led to an expanding balance of payments imbalance and a significant reduction in foreign exchange reserves since the latter half of FY22 (World Bank report 2023). Besides, other challenges are still persist including income inequality, urban-rural disparities, climate vulnerabilities, inadequate industrialization, and the huge gap in quality infrastructure. In this regard, as Bangladesh aspires to achieve middle-income status, international and bilateral partnerships are essential to ensure inclusive and resilient growth. And, along with global partnership, Bangladesh's bilateral relations are marked by a pragmatic and balanced approach, underscoring its focus on economic development and regional stability. Among all bilateral ties, the partnership between Bangladesh and Japan exemplifies enduring stability and cordiality. This bilateral tie shares a robust and multifaceted relations that founded on mutual respect and common development objectives. Following Japan's recognition of Bangladesh shortly after its independence, the bilateral relationship has progressively strengthened over the years. Japan stands among Bangladesh's largest development partners, offering substantial Official Development Assistance (ODA) for infrastructure, energy, and human resource development (Khatun et al. 2022, 2-4). Significant projects under Japan's Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B), such as the Matarbari Deep Sea Port and Dhaka Metro Rail, highlight Japan's dedication to the economic transformation of Bangladesh. Trade between the two nations has expanded, with Japan serving as a significant export market for Bangladesh’s ready-made clothing, while Bangladesh imports machinery, electronics, and automobiles from Japan (Ministry of Commerce, 2023). The partnership also encompasses not just economic links but also cultural exchanges, collaboration in disaster management, and mutual interests in regional stability and marine security.

Furthermore, Bangladesh-Japan relations have gained renewed significance in the context of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, which emphasizes the principles of rules-based order, freedom of navigation, and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. As a vital link between South and Southeast Asia, Bangladesh's geostrategic location aligns closely with Japan’s FOIP vision. Additionally, Bangladesh’s stable economic growth and commitment to regional peace make it a reliable partner for Japan in advancing FOIP goals, including countering maritime security threats and fostering inclusive development. For Bangladesh, engaging with Japan's FOIP provides an opportunity to leverage its geostrategic location and attract investment to enhance its infrastructure and industrial capabilities. Japan’s commitment to FOIP emphasizes inclusivity and mutual benefit (Hisahiro, 2024), offering Bangladesh a platform to bolster trade, maritime security, and capacity-building without aligning explicitly with any geopolitical bloc. As Japan advances its FOIP strategy, the deepening of bilateral ties with Bangladesh is set to contribute significantly to regional connectivity, economic growth, and a rules-based Indo-Pacific order. Moreover, Japan’s BIG-B initiative serves as a cornerstone of Bangladesh-Japan relations, aimed at fostering economic development and regional connectivity. This initiative represents Japan’s vision of leveraging Bangladesh’s unique geographic position to create a dynamic industrial hub linking South Asia with Southeast Asia. The projects under the BIG-B initiative not only enhance Bangladesh's economic capacity but also align with Japan’s broader strategic goals of promoting stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. BIG-B also symbolizes a deepening strategic partnership between the two countries, underpinned by mutual trust and shared development goals. Japan’s ODA to Bangladesh under BIG-B has enabled high-quality infrastructure development, positioning Bangladesh as a logistics and trade hub in the Bay of Bengal. The initiative also complements Bangladesh's ambitions of achieving middle-income status by 2030 and meeting its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

However, Bangladesh has lately experienced substantial political transformations, marked by a youth-driven uprising that contested entrenched governance systems and resulted in a transfer of power. This political change signifies widespread popular dissatisfaction regarding corruption, insufficient accountability, and economic inequality. Although this political change has been celebrated as a triumph for democratic principles, the post-uprising phase has significant challenges. Implementing a robust governance framework, enacting institutional reforms, and restoring public trust are urgent concerns. Also, economic difficulties, including inflation management, unemployment, and external debt, necessitate immediate attention to avert additional socio-economic turmoil. In navigating such post-upraising challenges, Bangladesh's approach would need to prioritise inclusivity, transparency, and resilience in order to ensure a prosperous and sustainable future. In this regard, Bangladesh must adeptly navigate complex regional and global dynamics to secure its stability and development. Balancing relations with major powers, is, therefore, very crucial to address post-uprising hurdles.

Against this context, this working paper attempts to identify how Bangladesh needs to gear up its economy and other infrastructural development so that it could hold its importance in the idea of FOIP and in this journey, how Japan’s connectivity initiative BIG-B can play role in enhancing Bangladesh’s position for promoting regional connectivity, economic growth, and a rules-based Indo-Pacific order. For doing so, the second and third sections try to outline Bangladesh-Japan relations in terms of FOIP and BIG-B. Subsequently, the fourth section attempts to identify key obstacles that might impede Bangladesh’s full potential in FOIP and BIG-B. In this regard, the fifth section attempts to come up with some future pathways to harness the full potential out of FOIP and BIG-B.

2. Bangladesh-Japan Relations in terms of FOIP

Bangladesh-Japan relations have gained renewed significance within the framework of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), as both nations aim to enhance connectivity, economic partnerships, and regional stability. Japan views Bangladesh as a strategic partner in its FOIP vision, particularly because of Bangladesh's geographic position at the nexus of South and Southeast Asia and its access to the Bay of Bengal. Additionally, Bangladesh’s growing economic potential and its adherence to international principles make it a reliable partner for Japan’s strategic interests in the region. This aligns with FOIP’s broader goals of promoting sustainable development, connectivity, and a rules-based order, allowing Bangladesh to emerge as a vital link in Indo-Pacific trade routes. 

From Bangladesh’s perspective, FOIP presents an opportunity to enhance its economic standing by deepening ties with Indo-Pacific countries, especially Japan. The emphasis that Japan is giving on inclusive development and sustainable connectivity across the Indo-Pacific, aligns with Bangladesh’s ambitions for infrastructural modernization and export-led growth. In this regard, the four pillars of Japan’s new FOIP are very much relevant for Bangladesh’s aspirations towards connectivity and economic growth. The four pillars that include; (1) promoting the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and a rules-based international order; (2) addressing urgent global challenges such as climate change, health crises, and digital transformation; (3) advancing connectivity through quality infrastructure; and (4) extending efforts for security and safe use of the sea to air for a prosperous Indo-Pacific region. These pillars aim to foster a resilient and inclusive Indo-Pacific that supports sustainable economic growth, regional stability, and a balance of power. Bangladesh holds strategic relevance to these pillars due to its geographic location, developmental aspirations, and role as a link between South and Southeast Asia.

Bangladesh’s position on the Bay of Bengal makes it a crucial point for ensuring maritime security and freedom of navigation, which aligns with FOIP's first pillar. In this regard, Bangladesh’s efforts to adopt international norms and standards resonate with Japan’s push for a rules-based order in the region. Most importantly, Bangladesh’s growing engagement in regional connectivity projects, such as the Blue Economy initiative and its active participation in international maritime organizations, positions it as a potential partner in promoting stability and inclusivity in the Indo-Pacific region. In this regard, Bangladesh’s signing of the High Sea Treaty in 2023, highlighted Bangladesh’s proactive engagement in strengthening the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the days approaching (Brewster, Bateman and Bergin, 2024). Additionally, Bangladesh's active participation in regional fisheries management, such as the Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Governmental Organisation (BOBP-IGO), bolsters its capacity to cooperate with adjacent nations on sustainable fisheries management which is very much important to improve safety at sea and ensuring maritime security. In terms of the second pillar, Bangladesh holds significant relevance to it, as it addresses global challenges such as climate change, health crises, and digital transformation. As one of the most climate-vulnerable nations, Bangladesh's adaptation and resilience strategies can serve as key areas for collaboration under Japan's climate-focused assistance. Japan's advanced technologies and expertise in disaster management align well with Bangladesh's need to combat rising sea levels, frequent cyclones, and flooding. Bangladesh's recent joining in the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI) as the co-lead of the 'Disaster Risk Reduction and Management' pillar illustrates its potential to serve as a regional partner in disaster management (Indian Council of World Affairs, 2022). In health crises, Bangladesh’s large population and public health challenges, including recent pandemic experiences, make it a critical partner for regional health security efforts. Furthermore, Bangladesh's emerging ICT sector and its strategic push towards digital transformation align with Japan’s vision for fostering inclusive digital economies, providing opportunities for cooperation in innovation, skill development, and the establishment of secure digital infrastructure.

Through the third pillar of Japan’s FOIP, Japan adopted the concept of multilayered connectivity which has the potential to have a significant influence on the regional and sub-regional connectivity throughout the region. To implement this initiative, three important regions such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands regions have also been identified under this multilayered connectivity. Out of these three regions, South Asia is going to receive much attention. Within South Asia, Bangladesh is uniquely positioned to serve as a hub for regional connectivity and cooperation. This is rooted in its geographical location, nestled between South and Southeast Asia, and its economic trajectory, which aligns with Japan’s vision of fostering a single, integrated economic zone. Through its investments in infrastructure, trade networks, and development partnerships in Bangladesh, Japan is signaling its intent to solidify the country’s role as a cornerstone of regional economic interlinkages. Then, in the fourth pillar focuses on extending efforts for security and the safe use of maritime and aerial domains to ensure a prosperous Indo-Pacific region, has relevance with Bangladesh as well. Situated along the northern coastline of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh occupies a strategic maritime position that is critical for regional trade, energy routes, and security dynamics. In this regard, Japan’s key role in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) can be regarded as one example for ensuring maritime security, where Bangladesh also a contracting party to this multilateral agreement. Particularly, Japan's initiatives to enhance Bangladesh's maritime capabilities, including cooperation on coastal surveillance and capacity-building for its navy and coast guard indicates Bangladesh’s growing significance in Japan’s FOIP. For example, in 2018, Japanese "Project for Improvement of Rescue Capacities in the Coastal and Inland Waters" grant aid cooperation allocated approximately 2.7 billion Japanese Yen for the procurement of coastal rescue vessels, aimed at enhancing maritime rescue and disaster relief capabilities in Bangladesh's coastal and inland waters, thereby aiding in the mitigation of damage from maritime accidents and natural disasters, under the operation of the Bangladesh Coast Guard (Embassy of Japan, 2018). This kind of assistance from Japan to Bangladesh demonstrates Bangladesh’s significance in terms of Japan’s FOIP.

Furthermore, the release of Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific outlook (IPO) in 2023, demonstrates its relevance with Japan's FOIP, particularly in fostering connectivity, stability, and economic integration in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). Bangladesh's IPO emphasizes inclusive development, multilateral cooperation, and maritime security, which resonate with Japan’s FOIP objectives of promoting a rules-based order, enhancing regional connectivity, and ensuring freedom of navigation. This development indicates the renewed dynamics of Bangladesh-Japan relations in terms of Japan’s FOIP.

3. Bilateral cooperation under BIG-B

The Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) initiative represents a cornerstone of the Bangladesh-Japan relation, aimed at transforming Bangladesh into a regional hub of connectivity and industrialization. Launched in 2014 during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Dhaka, BIG-B focuses on leveraging Bangladesh’s strategic location at the nexus of South and Southeast Asia to promote infrastructure development, industrial growth, and regional connectivity. The initiative aligns with Japan’s broader FOIP vision, emphasizing the creation of seamless economic zones and enhancing trade networks in the region. The core concept of the BIG-B Initiative is to accelerate development in the Dhaka-Chattogram-Cox's Bazar belt area and promoting socio-economic advancement in Bangladesh. This initiative is fundamentally grounded in three pillars, namely, (1) industry and trade, (2) energy and (3) economic connectivity, and aims to enhance the prosperity and development by leveraging the strategic location of Bangladesh. Also, this initiative aims to alleviate poverty through private investment, enforce legislative measures to address catastrophic risks, and demonstrate leadership in attaining the development objectives of the international community (Sawada, 2014). To accomplish these three pillars, Japan intends to implement the development of a deep-sea port, the establishment of coal and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) power plants and establishing a trade network via Matarbari Island in Bangladesh.

In terms of infrastructural development, the BIG-B initiative has the capacity to contribute in establishing hard connectivity infrastructures, as the Government of Bangladesh aims to attract substantial foreign direct investments to enhance economic development and industrial sites. Therefore, the idea of executing “Moheshkhali-Matarbari Integrated Infrastructure Development Initiative (MIDI)” came under the BIG-B initiative. Hence, the MIDI becomes a fundamental development project for BIG-B in the Matarbari and Moheshkhali Islands, as well as the adjacent regions of Moheshkhali Sub-district and Chakaria Sub-district in Cox’s Bazar District. Another flagship projects under the BIG-B initiative is the construction of the Matarbari Deep Sea Port, which seeks to transform Bangladesh into a regional logistics hub. This state-of-the-art port is expected to accommodate large container ships, thereby reducing dependency on regional ports like Colombo and Singapore. Apart from the MIDI project, there is another significant project under BIG-B is the Dhaka Metro Rail, which aims to revolutionize urban transportation in the capital city. This project addresses the growing traffic congestion in Dhaka, reducing commute times and contributing to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, the BIG-B initiative encompasses projects like the modernization of the Chittagong Port, the development of economic zones, and improved road and railway connectivity across the country.

In terms of energy, the MIDI under the BIG-B initiative also includes power plant project which is known as Matarbari Ultra Super Critical Coal-Fired Power Project. Under this project, Japan has significantly invested in developing energy infrastructure, including the construction of this state-of-the-art coal-fired power plant and associated facilities. This energy Project aims to address Bangladesh's growing energy demands, ensuring a reliable electricity supply for industrial and residential needs. Japan is also contributing to the development of the Matarbari port and energy terminals, facilitating the import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to diversify Bangladesh's energy mix and enhance energy security. This infrastructure will not only boost domestic economic growth but also strengthen connectivity within the Bay of Bengal region, aligning with Japan's vision for regional economic integration and stability (Hoassain, 2024).

In terms of establishing economic zones and industrial network, Japan's BIG-B (Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt) initiative has been instrumental in transforming Matarbari in Bangladesh into a thriving hub for economic zones and industrial networks. In this regard, the Matarbari deep-sea port is designed to boost Bangladesh's connectivity and trade capacity. This port is expected to position Matarbari as a strategic gateway for regional and global commerce, attracting foreign direct investment and facilitating smoother supply chain operations. Furthermore, Japanese expertise and funding have played a crucial role in the development of associated infrastructure, creating a conducive environment for industries to thrive. These developments are aligned with Bangladesh’s goals to diversify its export base and elevate its status as a manufacturing and logistics hub. Also, the BIG-B initiative emphasizes the creation of industrial networks that integrate Matarbari into the regional value chain. By promoting partnerships between Japanese and Bangladeshi companies, the initiative encourages technology transfer, skill development, and capacity building, particularly in energy-intensive sectors like manufacturing and electronics. The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the region is fostering industrial agglomeration, making it attractive for multinational corporations seeking cost-effective production bases. These efforts are not only generating employment opportunities for the local population but also enhancing Bangladesh's competitiveness in global markets. As part of a broader vision, the BIG-B initiative is helping to establish Matarbari as a vital economic corridor in South Asia, bridging South and Southeast Asian economies.

Hence, it is seen that the projects under the BIG-B initiative align with Bangladesh’s vision of becoming a middle-income country while fostering regional integration with South and Southeast Asia. Japan’s active involvement underscores its commitment to strengthening economic ties and advancing the strategic value of the Bay of Bengal region. These projects reflect Japan’s long-term commitment to addressing Bangladesh’s infrastructural bottlenecks, fostering economic resilience, and reducing logistical inefficiencies, which are essential for sustaining high growth rates and attracting foreign direct investment. These investments not only support Bangladesh's aspirations for industrialization and sustainable development but also align with Japan's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. By fostering technological transfer, generating employment, and strengthening supply chain networks, BIG-B projects have cemented Japan’s role as a critical development partner for Bangladesh, deepening mutual trust and opening new avenues for collaboration in trade, investment, and security.

Beyond trade and infrastructure in the land, the BIG-B initiative underscores the importance of maritime trade and transportation, where Bangladesh plays a crucial role. By prioritizing the development of port-led connectivity, this initiative is expected to facilitate greater regional integration in terms of maritime trade and transportation among South Asian countries. By improving port infrastructure, particularly in Matarbari, the initiative enhances Bangladesh’s capacity to handle larger volumes of maritime trade. The development of this deep-sea port, coupled with modern logistics facilities, allows Bangladesh to serve as a gateway for regional trade. This fosters greater connectivity between South Asia, Southeast Asia, and beyond, reducing dependency on traditional chokepoints. Consequently, countries such as Nepal, Bhutan stand to benefit from smoother and more efficient trade routes, boosting regional economic integration. Additionally, the BIG-B initiative focuses on enhancing multimodal transportation networks, linking ports with highways, railways, and industrial zones. Improved connectivity between coastal areas and hinterlands ensures faster movement of goods, reducing transportation costs and delivery times. This also supports supply chain resilience, attracting foreign investment and enabling Bangladesh to play a critical role in global value chains.

For South Asia, the BIG-B initiative can have the capacity to redefine regional trade dynamics by providing an alternative maritime corridor, strengthening economic ties, and fostering greater cooperation across borders. By bridging infrastructure gaps, it positions Bangladesh as a linchpin in facilitating sustainable economic growth in the broader South Asian region. Hence, the partnership between Bangladesh and Japan under the BIG-B initiative has the capability to foster mutual trust and showcases shared commitments to stability and prosperity in South Asia. The deepening of economic ties through BIG-B has also led to closer political and cultural cooperation, reflecting the maturity of a relationship that has evolved from aid dependency to strategic partnership. Also, as both nations continue to collaborate, their partnership under the BIG-B initiative underscores the importance of connectivity and economic growth, making Bangladesh a key player in the Indo-Pacific’s evolving geopolitical landscape.

4. Obstacles to implement FOIP and BIG-B

The FOIP and BIG-B initiative serve as visionary initiatives for enhancing connectivity, economic vitality and stability in the region. However, their implementation exposes a complex array of challenges. From competing interests of global powers and regional stakeholders, to infrastructural gaps, governance bottlenecks, and environmental vulnerabilities, these initiatives are caught in a web of complexities. Therefore, understanding the challenges that impede the realisation of FOIP and BIG-B, is crucial for devising a practical path ahead.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict can be regarded as an important challenge that can hinder Japan's endeavours to realise its FOIP objective. Japan perceives FOIP as a foundation for upholding a rules-based international order; nevertheless, Russia's invasion of Ukraine undermined this principle by breaching international norms about sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has necessitated Japan to augment its defence budget and amend its national security strategy, indicating a more assertive position in reaction to global power realignments intensified by the conflict (Johnstone, 2022). This entails augmenting defence expenditure to 2% of the nation's GDP by 2027—a significant 60% rise that will position Japan with the third-largest defence budget globally (Kawai, 2024). Japan is dedicated to enhancing its relation with Ukraine while also revising its national security policy. Moreover, since the commencement of the conflict, the Japanese government has dispatched military equipment and humanitarian aid, among other endeavours. Hence, Japan’s decision to augment its defense budget and increased military spending has diverted resources from key diplomatic and economic initiatives essential for fostering regional stability.

In terms of energy security, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has profoundly impact as it underscores its vulnerability as a nation reliant on energy imports. Prior to the conflict, Japan depended significantly on Russia for a considerable share of its liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is essential for its energy security and industrial requirements. The conflict resulted in increased global tensions, instigating sanctions on Russia and compelling Japan to diversify its energy resources. Nevertheless, these policies led to heightened energy procurement expenses, imposing further financial strain on Japanese sectors and consumers. The increase in global energy costs significantly worsened Japan's energy situation, intensifying its already significant dependence on imported fossil fuels, which account for about 90% of its energy composition (Cahill, Nakano and Irie, 2024). The conflict has also disrupted global energy markets, intensifying competition for LNG supplies from alternative sources, including Australia, the United States, and the Middle East. Japan's necessity to ensure stable energy supplies in this competitive landscape has stressed its energy diplomacy and economic relations. The situation has highlighted Japan's difficulties in shifting to renewable energy. Notwithstanding its ambitious decarbonisation objectives, the nation encounters challenges in augmenting domestic renewable energy output owing to geographical and legislative limitations.

Furthermore, due to expanded defense budget, the core focus of FOIP and BIG-B which is on Infrastructure development, economic partnerships, capacity-building programs and regional connectivity, may face reduced funding. As of 2023, Japan ranked as the third greatest supplier of financial assistance to Ukraine, contributing $3.7 billion in concessional financing and grants for the year, and a cumulative total of $4.2 billion since the onset of the full-scale invasion (Cilliers, 2024).  At the same time, Japan's new development cooperation charter illustrates its commitment to enhancing engagement with developing nations and optimising the effectiveness and strategy of its development cooperation efforts. And most importantly, in its revised FOIP strategy, unveiled in March 2023, Japan will intensify its commitment to FOIP by allocating over 75 billion U.S. dollars, encompassing both private and governmental infrastructure investments, to enhance the Indo-Pacific area in collaboration with other nations by 2030 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023). However, as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has uncertain future, hence, allocating more funding to Ukraine may constrain Japan's ability to invest in substantial infrastructure projects, including ports, railways, and industrial corridors, which are essential for regional stability and its overarching development objectives.

Another major challenge is the escalating crisis in the Middle East, which presents considerable obstacles to Japan's FOIP strategy and its principal endeavour, the BIG-B initiative. Both endeavours depend significantly on regional stability and active trade routes, especially the vital chokepoints in the region for oil supply. Heightened volatility in the Middle East, therefore, undermines energy security, compelling Japan to reallocate resources and diplomatic focus to safeguard its oil imports. This redirection may burden Japan's ability to fund and execute infrastructure and economic collaborations under FOIP and BIG-B. Moreover, geopolitical concerns may obstruct engagement with Middle Eastern partners, which may constrain FOIP and BIG-B's efficacy in promoting regional connectivity and stability. Also, rise in oil price due to growing conflicts in the Middle East and economic instability may escalate expenses for infrastructure initiatives and diminish the readiness of partner governments to engage in long-term partnerships. Furthermore, intensified security apprehensions in the Indo-Pacific area, aggravated by Middle Eastern conflicts, may compel Japan to adjust its strategic priorities, undermining its capacity to implement FOIP and BIG-B projects efficiently.

Then, the prolonged crises in the Middle East may intensify political polarisation and establish conflicting goals for partner states engaged in Japan's FOIP effort. Countries that are strongly dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies may prioritise the assurance of their energy requirements over engagement in regional development initiatives. The crisis also threatens to exacerbate geopolitical rivalries, complicating Japan's efforts to cultivate the multilateral collaboration vital for its capacity-building and economic partnership objectives. If regional tensions escalate into wider regions, it may jeopardise the strategic stability essential for the efficacy of Japan's FOIP and BIG-B frameworks.

Subsequently, the recent youth-led uprising and substantial political change in Bangladesh may present considerable obstacles to Japan's FOIP vision and the BIG-B initiative. These frameworks depend significantly on political stability, consistent governance, and conformity with Japan's economic and geopolitical priorities. A politically unstable atmosphere may result in policy ambiguity, delays in infrastructural advancement, and a possible alteration in Bangladesh's foreign policy priorities. Such disruptions may also undermine Bangladesh's significance as a crucial component of Japan's FOIP strategy, which aims to guarantee maritime security and enhance connectivity throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

Furthermore, the absence of security during the post-revolutionary era in Bangladesh may substantially impede the execution of Japan's FOIP strategy and the BIG-B initiative. A post-revolutionary environment characterised by instability may dissuade Japanese investors, postpone essential projects, and diminish Bangladesh's appeal as a strategic partner, therefore jeopardising Japan's regional objectives. Moreover, ongoing security problems, including political instability, and weaker state institutions, may undermine Japan's initiatives to foster a rules-based order in the region. Japan's developmental efforts in Bangladesh are intricately linked to promoting robust supply networks and guaranteeing unimpeded navigation in the Indo-Pacific. If Bangladesh's governance framework fails to mitigate post-revolution volatility, it may hinder Japan's strategic objectives.

5. Directives for navigating challenges

Japan's FOIP strategy and the BIG-B plan are ambitious initiatives which designed to promote economic integration, connectivity, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Nonetheless, the successful execution of these initiatives tends to encounter obstacles that necessitate explicit direction.
A primary directive is to enhance diplomatic relations with regional allies. Japan must collaborate closely with nations in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean Region to synchronise its ambitions with regional development aspirations. Establishing trust via clear communication and showcasing mutual benefits can mitigate scepticism, especially among smaller nations who are apprehensive about collaborating with stronger powers.

A further essential directive is to tackling financial and infrastructural challenges. Japan's dedication to quality infrastructure in FOIP and BIG-B must reconcile cost efficiency with long-term sustainability. Providing adaptable finance options, capacity-building assistance, and technological transfers can empower partner nations to implement projects without incurring unsustainable debt. Furthermore, collaborations with international development banks and the use of private sector investment are crucial for enhancing resource mobilisation. These measures can guarantee that Japan's initiatives stay competitive and appealing.

Then, minimising geopolitical risks is absolutely necessary in order to successfully navigate the hurdles that come with deploying FOIP and BIG-B. The Indo-Pacific region is characterised by conflicts and situations in which significant countries have interests that overlap with one another. In order to avoid the appearance of forming an exclusive group, Japan ought to embrace a cooperative strategy, working with other nations that share similar values to advance a rules-based system. Reducing friction can be accomplished by engaging China in a positive manner whenever it is possible, particularly on matters such as climate change. Japan is able to improve the resiliency and attractiveness of its FOIP and BIG-B efforts by ensuring that it maintains a balance between strategic assertiveness and inclusivity. By maintaining a balance between strategic assertiveness and inclusivity, Japan can enhance the resilience and appeal of its FOIP and BIG-B initiatives.

A further direction for ensuring the sustainability of the projects under the BIG-B may involve prioritising environmentally sustainable practices. This entails the incorporation of green technology and renewable energy solutions in infrastructure development, minimising carbon footprints, and complying with stringent environmental standards. Prioritising community engagement is essential to comprehend local requirements and alleviate displacement threats, hence ensuring the sustainability and acceptance of the projects. Furthermore, to enhance the economic and social impact, the BIG-B program must link with Bangladesh's national development strategies and international sustainability frameworks, including the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Enhancing the capabilities of local industries and human resources is crucial to optimise the advantages of industrial expansion. Japan ought to facilitate technology transfer, enhance skill development, and foster innovation partnerships to empower Bangladeshi workers and businesses. Consequently, in addition to prioritising hard infrastructure development, Japan must also consider the integration of soft infrastructure, including the development of human resources through necessary education and advanced training for project-related personnel, provision of basic healthcare for project staff and workers, and transmission of advanced technology.

Another significant directive pertains to Post-uprising Bangladesh. This period is facing a critical juncture. As the success of this FOIP and the BIG-B depends on achieving political stability and cultivating an investment-friendly climate in Bangladesh, hence, the new administration in Bangladesh must emphasise transparent governance, institutional reforms, and anti-corruption initiatives to restore investor confidence. In this regard, restoring law and order situation, addressing internal issues including bureaucratic inefficiencies and aligning infrastructure projects with sustainable development objectives, is crucial for attracting Japanese investments and technical knowledge.

6. Concluding remarks

The FOIP and BIG-B, both offers prospects for Bangladesh’s economic advancement, regional connectivity, and geopolitical importance. The BIG-B initiative offers prospects for Bangladesh as a vital connection between South and Southeast Asia through infrastructural enhancements, energy diversification, and industrial progress. The BIG-B initiative, with its focus on high-quality infrastructure development, energy diversification, and industrial modernization, aims to transform Bangladesh into a dynamic industrial and logistical hub. Projects like the Matarbari Deep Sea Port and Moheshkhali-Matarbari Integrated Development Initiative not only boost domestic economic capacities but also align seamlessly with broader regional connectivity goals, allowing Bangladesh to tap into expanded markets and attract substantial foreign investment.Also, the bilateral partnership highlights the common objective of Bangladesh and Japan for a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific, promoting mutual development aims while augmenting Bangladesh's strategic significance in the area.

However, in order to fully realise the promise of these initiatives, it is necessary to overcome considerable hurdles. These challenges include political transitions in Bangladesh, geopolitical tensions in the region, and resource limits that are a result of global conflicts. It is of the utmost importance for Bangladesh to cultivate inclusive economic strategy, institutional and governance resilience, and transparency in governance. Similarly, Japan's unwavering dedication to the development of high-quality infrastructure, the transfer of technological know-how, and environmentally responsible practices will guarantee long-term advantages. By handling these obstacles with a realistic and cooperative approach, Bangladesh and Japan can unleash new pathways for growth and stability, thereby establishing a precedent for successful collaborations in a geopolitical landscape that is always shifting.





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