第1回重光・ダレス会談（1955年8月29日）

1955年8月29日に行われた、重光葵外務大臣・ジョン・F・ダレス（John F. Dulles）国務長官の第1回会談の記録である。日本側、米国側、そして日米両国の記録の対照表が掲載されている。

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日本側記録

米国側記録

{
	"time": 1713170236862,
	"blocks": [
		{
			"id": "ezTuuBDfLc",
			"type": "header",
			"data": {
				"text": "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 29, 1955",
				"level": 2
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "DkXG-FUtFO",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "U. S. Department of State,&nbsp;Foreign Relations of the United States:&nbsp;1955-1957, Japan, Volume ⅩⅩⅢ, Part1"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "DrvtzM6iG_",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "X0uja0UeGU",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Washington, August 29, 1955"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "ccSnB3gMRL",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "SUBJECT"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "HlxBgH9Nhh",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "First Meeting with&nbsp;Shigemitsu: International Situation; Communist China; Japan’s Talks with USSR"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "zCVPwKCpeM",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "PARTICIPANTS"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "CbpjVPK84O",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Japan"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "wt1hgXoLLO",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Foreign Minister&nbsp;Shigemitsu"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "vkBmgR87Tw",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Minister of Agriculture &amp; Forestry&nbsp;Kono"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "OkJWfE9n22",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Secretary General of Japan Democratic Party&nbsp;Kishi"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "7ZknssPHCF",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Ambassador&nbsp;Iguchi, Japanese Embassy"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "DhYnKBs8Ou",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Ambassador Kase, Japanese Observer&nbsp;UN&nbsp;Delegation"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "OZGvV32dPu",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Minister&nbsp;Shima, Japanese Embassy"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "p0HGAx__Lv",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary&nbsp;Matsumoto"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "gf6vWKOeMX",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": ""
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "9LNGsOLAnJ",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "United States"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "Hr7Djicxla",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary "
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "yO9XVcy2mh",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "G—Mr. Murphy"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "LHLG-KwHt4",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Ambassador Allison"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "grV0Nwciz-",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "FE—Mr. Sebald"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "0zw0wV4OWe",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "P—Mr. McCardle"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "Z_AKMLOakf",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "NA—Mr. McClurkin"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "HDwrHt9fxl",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "NA—Mr. Finn"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "S4Ezkus3zQ",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Foreign Minister stated that he had been looking forward to meeting the Secretary personally and that this meeting would give him real pleasure. He noted that the Secretary had been the principal architect of the friendly relations now existing between the United States and Japan and said that on behalf of the people of Japan he wished to express lasting gratitude."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "o7JUkMCAWf",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary expressed pleasure at the opportunity of meeting the Foreign Minister and his associates, adding that he is always interested to meet friends from Japan because he takes a lively interest in Japanese matters as a result of having worked to bring about the Treaty of Peace. He commented that the Treaty is unique for its spirit of reconciliation and absence of vengefulness. The Secretary said that the United States desired a treaty of this sort because of its high regard for Japan’s potential as a great nation able to exert a constructive influence. He observed that despite small differences wide areas of agreement exist between Japan and the United States and that each respects the motives and purposes of the other."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "ZowkUf-vTC",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary said that during the morning he had talked on the telephone with the President, who had asked him to convey his regards to the Foreign Minister and to the people of Japan, had expressed regret that he could not be present and had asked the Secretary to convey his hope that the discussions would help promote even better and closer relations in the future."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "A7Dgm9wpCu",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Foreign Minister then read a general statement summarizing points he desired to discuss. A copy of this statement is attached."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "maNzaqJNH2",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary said he would like to make some general observations in response."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "HoSfGe4Qx-",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Soviet policies. The Secretary emphasized that the Geneva meeting of the Heads of Government&nbsp;had come about because of the failure of Soviet policies and not because of their success. The Soviets had for ten years tried to overrun Europe and Asia by tough tactics. They had had some initial successes in Europe due to the presence of their occupation troops and had had a considerable success in China. Their policies had recently met reverses and after the death of Stalin they considered a change of policy. For several years there was a division in Soviet thinking as to how to proceed. They had continued their tough policies in an effort to frustrate the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into&nbsp;NATO&nbsp;and had used every means short of war. With the failure of these efforts they took a series of steps which had clearly been prepared in advance: they signed the Austrian Peace Treaty; they made peace with Tito despite their seven years of threatening and abusing him; they submitted a disarmament proposal on May 10 at variance with their previous position and partly accepting the position of the Western Powers; they invited Adenauer, who they had previously treated as an outcast, to go to Moscow; they proposed the peace negotiations with Japan; and they issued new orders of the day requiring their representatives to be all smiles and cordiality. Their internal situation has also been causing the Soviet leaders concern: they had been placing an almost intolerable burden on their people by devoting such a large proportion of their efforts to military expansion and capital development. Modern armament is very costly, and on the basis of comparative economic strength the USSR would have to spend each year about $150 billion for military activity to equal the United States effort. This burden is very heavy even for a police state, and as Stalin had said the Communist nations occasionally need a respite."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "SKCRHLZFqB",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary said that the free nations are willing to give the Communists a respite but on a very provisional basis. The Soviets have not yet paid the price to end the Cold War, and Geneva was not the end of a period but merely the beginning. The spirit of Geneva must be injected into a number of other situations, such as the unification of Germany, the Soviet treatment of the satellite nations, its efforts to spread international communism, and its attitude toward inspection in the interest of disarmament, before the spirit becomes really genuine. The meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee now starting in New York will be one test of the spirit of Geneva, and the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in October will provide a fuller test."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "fCSX-65GXy",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Disarmament.&nbsp;The Secretary said he did not propose to go in to a full review of the European situation but believed a discussion of disarmament would be useful. The United States believes today that a system of inspection and control can provide an effective step toward disarmament. The greatest insurance against a major war is the capacity of the free nations for retaliation, since a nation starting a war will itself suffer grievous damage through the other side’s power to retaliate. The United States has the capacity for retaliation largely because of its supremacy in the atomic field and because of its agreements with friendly nations for the maintenance of air bases available to strike the Soviet Union. The danger exists that the Soviet Union can develop a powerful atomic capability and through a surprise attack destroy the capacity of the free nations to retaliate. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union can catch up to the United States in the development of atomic weapons, but they may be able to develop a capacity for a surprise attack which could destroy any effort at retaliation. The United States believes that inspection, particularly aerial inspection and some ground inspection, could provide knowledge of the build-up for an attack of this magnitude and thus eliminate the possibility of an attack which could wipe out our retaliatory power. Thus our deterrent to such an attack would remain. This is the approach which the United States is taking at the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee, and it will be interesting to see whether the Soviet Union will agree."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "MobeXW9b78",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary said he realized that the issue of atomic weapons is very important and sensitive in Japan. He commented that atomic weapons are here to stay and that even if it were possible to abolish them, as the Soviet Union would like to do, it is doubtful whether abolition would be desirable from the point of view of the free nations, although we hope their use can be prevented. But if atomic weapons were banned, the chief deterrent against Communist aggression would vanish. The United States itself might not be so easily attacked in such a situation, but countries more readily accessible to vast Soviet land armies would be in great danger."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "u7kRYQdvEr",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary added that developments in the field of atomic science now make it impossible to prevent the development of atomic weapons, since fissionable material necessary for weapons is developed even through ordinary peaceful uses of atomic energy. Abolition of atomic weapons is thus not feasible. The key to disarmament is primarily one of preventing a surprise attack. If the danger of a surprise attack can be diminished, reduction of armaments may follow."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "IWk33Vyth9",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Communist China.&nbsp;The United States does not believe that the policies of Communist China are such as to entitle it to a seat in the United Nations or to recognition by the United States. This is not because the mainland government is Communist, since the United States has relations with a number of Communist countries. The Communist regime in China came into being through force and still believes in the use of force in its international relations. Consequently we believe that anything the United States might do to enhance the power or prestige of Communist China would be against our interests. The Communist revolution in China was a more extensive one in time than the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The Chinese Communists have consistently resorted to force—in Korea, and in Indochina, and they had intended to seize Formosa by force. To meet the Communist threat to Indochina the United States had proposed a multilateral security treaty to certain of the nations directly concerned in Southeast Asia. The French and the United Kingdom, however, felt that the Geneva Conference on an armistice should take place first and be followed by a Security Treaty. The Manila Pact was concluded just about one year ago and has contributed measurably to peace and order in Asia even though conditions are still far from ideal. The Communists then shifted their interests from Indochina to Taiwan, and the United States took strong measures of its own including a Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of China covering Taiwan and the Pescadores and a joint resolution by the Congress with only three dissenting votes in each House authorizing the President to use force if he deemed it necessary for the defense of Taiwan, the Pescadores or related areas. The Secretary commented that he had felt at that time that the chances of war were even, but he had believed that the chance had to be taken since failure to stand up to the Communists would have been most unfortunate."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "B8YlAiCT4Q",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "At the Bandung Conference, which Japan had attended, the United States urged friendly governments to press upon the Chinese Communists the danger of their pursuing forceful means. Bandung had had a very wholesome influence on the Communists in persuading them that the nations of Asia would not support their use of force. Chou had then proposed discussions with the United States, and the Secretary had replied that the United States was prepared to talk on matters of direct concern to the two governments but not on matters involving third countries. For several months various intermediaries stepped in, but the United States was not satisfied as to the motives and reliability of some of these intermediaries. The United States, therefore, started direct talks with the Chinese Communists at Geneva one month ago on the subject of repatriation of civilians, but unfortunately there had not been much progress. The Chinese Communists are not certain whether their interests are served by giving up the American civilians they hold or by keeping them as hostages. In response to the Foreign Minister’s question the Secretary said the Chinese are holding 41 or 42, mostly in jail or under ignominious conditions, not counting turncoats whose return the United States does not want."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "vpVUZ5VFDX",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary said that he had recently been expounding at his press conferences and elsewhere the doctrine of non-use of force. He said he thinks the Chinese Communists now realize it will be futile to use force to attempt to unify Korea. Although the status of Formosa has not been decided, there are a number of other divided countries such as Korea and Germany, and the important thing is to get acceptance of the doctrine of non-use of force. The only way to get countries like Communist China to adopt a more acceptable way of international life is to use methods which will bring them around to this. There have been two conflicting views on how to treat Communist China—either to bring it into the United Nations in the hope that it will behave better or to keep it out until it does behave better. The United States believes in the latter theory. The United Nations Charter was drafted in 1945 in such a way as to impose certain requirements on nations entering the United Nations, and although some mistakes may have been made in 1945 in allowing certain countries to enter the United Nations, the requirements of the Charter should be maintained."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "C15u8rHwLv",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Secretary said in summary that the policies of the United States are to give support to non-Communist countries, to be prepared if necessary to fight if these countries are attacked, to give these countries economic aid and assistance as needed, and to seek to bring about changes in the character and attitude of the Communist countries. The Secretary said that he believed some progress was being made but that progress requires the free nations to stand firm and solid and to make it clear to the Communist nations that they must change their policies."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "zr_bRdXNMg",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Role of Japan.&nbsp;The Secretary said that the United States, although it has permanent interests in the Western Pacific, is not an Asian power while Japan is an Asian power and a very great one. It would be normal if Japan were exerting a greater influence and the United States&nbsp;were exerting less influence in Asia. The United States does not desire to act as a sort of balance-of-power in Asia. Japan should do this and the United States would be happier in this event. Some nations feel the United States is exerting itself in various parts of the world out of ambition but the idea of aggrandizement does not for a moment enter into the thinking of the United States. The United States does not stand in the way of any nation desiring to exercise a constructive role. The Secretary stressed that he has always sought to accelerate the time when Japan would use its potential influence in Asia in a healthy way."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "dVrq_D73Eb",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "The Foreign Minister stated that this is the objective of his Government and that this is the duty and responsibility of Japan."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "nB1iJJOjKk",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Japan’s negotiations with the Soviet Union.&nbsp;In reply to the Secretary’s question, the Foreign Minister said that these talks were not making much progress. The Foreign Minister handed the Secretary a prepared paper summarizing the positions of Japan and the Soviet Union (copy attached).&nbsp;The Secretary noted a reference in the Japanese paper to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin&nbsp;and commented that he had inserted a provision into the Japanese Peace Treaty (Article 25) stating that no right, title, or interest of Japan shall be deemed to diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a state which did not sign it. This provision had been inserted to insure that nonsignatories did not get any advantage from the Treaty. The Secretary noted that all of Japan’s detainees in the Soviet Union were also alleged to be in prison and commented that this was a favorite Communist device. The Secretary observed that it looked as if Japan’s negotiations with the Soviet Union had a long way to go and said he thought Japan is handling the talks very well. He observed that on the basis of his experience very little is achieved by making concessions to the Soviets on small points. Soviet leaders decide on the basis of fundamental considerations whether they want an agreement or not, and their attitude is not influenced by minor concessions. The negotiations of the Western Powers with Austria was a clear illustration of the Soviet method. The Foreign Minister asked the Secretary whether he thought the Soviets wanted a treaty with Japan. The Secretary replied yes and said he thought the Soviets would make some concessions to get it, adding that they would probably attempt to tire the Japanese out."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "zBBqNA-BjU",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Domestic Political Situation in Japan.&nbsp;The Foreign Minister stressed the determination of his Government to construct a new Japan and to build up his country in a proper way. Mr.&nbsp;Kono&nbsp;and Mr.&nbsp;Kishi&nbsp;are working hard for the unification of the constructive forces in Japan,&nbsp;ealizing that internal and external politics have a close connection. The Government has also developed a six-year economic plan and a six-year defense plan, but to realize these plans the Government will need unified forces within Japan and a thorough understanding with us. The Secretary commented that it seems to us, looking at it from the outside and not wanting at all to interfere in a Japanese domestic problem, that it is necessary to draw together the Conservative forces within Japan and to develop unity of action. He hoped that steps in this direction could be taken and would soon succeed. At the Foreign Minister’s request&nbsp;Kishi&nbsp;stated that the general policies Mr.&nbsp;Shigemitsu&nbsp;had been describing were not only the viewpoints of the Hatoyama Government but of all the conservative groups in Japan. Therefore a consolidation of these forces was desirable in order to make it possible to bring about the desired goals. Mr. Hatoyama agrees. He and Mr.&nbsp;Kono&nbsp;were working with the Liberals to try to accomplish this unification. The Secretary said that if there were a solidly unified Government within Japan it might be easier for us to act when we are asked to do something to help. Now it seems we are often asked to do things which will help one Government or one individual stay in power and we find difficulty in meeting such requests. If the Japanese could unify their Government it would undoubtedly be found much easier to get along with us. Mr.&nbsp;Shigemitsu&nbsp;responded that that was exactly the job that they are trying to do."
			}
		}
	],
	"version": "2.26.5"
}