吉田・ダレス会談（1951年1月29日）

1951年1月29日（日本側記録では午後4時、米国側記録では午後4時半）に行われた、吉田茂首相とジョン・F・ダレス（John F. Dulles）対日講和問題担当特使の会談の、日本側、米国側、及び日米両国の記録の対照表である。

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日本側記録

米国側記録

日米対照表

解題

米国側記録

{
	"time": 1680273536211,
	"blocks": [
		{
			"id": "AIACoRuJ5S",
			"type": "header",
			"data": {
				"text": "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison)",
				"level": 3
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "nQhSpiOQLZ",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "U. S. Department of State, <i>Foreign Relations of the United States: 1951</i>,&nbsp;Volume Ⅵ, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1, pp827-830."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "goOj4zJwnX",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p1/d487"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "rBgboAPETe",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": ""
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "a0kGWszJBE",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "&nbsp;　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　[Tokyo,] January 29, 1951."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "4RXIDrMgps",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "Participants:\tPrime Minister Yoshida, Ambassador Dulles, Ambassador Sebald, Assistant Secretary Johnson and Mr. Allison"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "1aB9f_cEQg",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "　　Prime Minister Yoshida called at 4:30 p. m. by appointment for his first interview with Ambassador Dulles on peace treaty problems. After the usual exchange of courtesies Mr. Yoshida stated that there were one or two points he wished to raise. He recalled his statements to Mr. Dulles last June that in dealing with the Japanese people it was necessary to consider their <i>amour-propre</i> and in this connection there were certain aspects of ordinances and legislation which had been inspired by the Occupation which, in Mr. Yoshida’s opinion, should be altered prior to concluding a peace treaty. He stated that he was having a list of these matters prepared for presentation to SCAP. Mr. Yoshida specifically mentioned and emphasized the Occupation-inspired revision of the Japanese Civil Code with its consequent effect upon the family system in Japan. Mr. Yoshida recognized the benevolence and good will of much of the Occupation activities but stated matters such as the family system, which were of deep significance to the Japanese, had sometimes been ignored and that if some of the ordinances and legislation affecting such matters could be rescinded it would create a favorable atmosphere for the conclusion of a treaty."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "RPSurI2cqN",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "　　The Prime Minister then went on to speak of certain economic problems which were of concern and he mentioned particularly necessity for expansion of fishing areas, increase in ship-building and also the necessity of continuing and increasing investments from the United States in Japanese industrial enterprises. Mr. Yoshida spoke of the long term necessity of trading with China, and while he realized that in view of the present communist domination of that country it would not be possible to expect great results in the near future, nevertheless, he believed that in the long run the Chinese would adopt the attitude that “war is war and trade is trade” and that it would be possible for a reasonable degree of trade to take place between Japan and China. In this connection, Mr. Yoshida advanced the thought that Japanese business men, because of their long acquaintance with and experience in China, will be the best fifth column of democracy against the Chinese communists.※1 Mr. Dulles pointed out that many of these economic problems might be difficult to solve because of the interests of the various allied countries concerned. He made clear that many of the Allies would, for one reason or another, want to impose certain restrictions upon Japan. Mr. Yoshida seemed to feel that if the United States adopted a lenient attitude that was all that was necessary and that the other countries would follow suit. In fact, Mr. Yoshida’s whole attitude towards the treaty was that it would be a comparatively simple matter to conclude and that the United States was in a position to put through almost anything it desired."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "lI4kZsRt3Z",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "　　In connection with this attitude held by Mr. Yoshida, Mr. Dulles made clear that the treaty was a very serious matter and that it was not enough merely to have the Japanese people go through the form of accepting it but that it should, in fact, be really acceptable to all shades of opinion in Japan. Mr. Dulles, therefore, inquired of Mr. Yoshida what his opinion was as to the position of the opposition parties and what Mr. Yoshida’s opinion was regarding the acceptability of a treaty along the general lines contained in the United States’ seven-point memorandum. Mr. Yoshida seemed to believe that there would be no real difficulty in obtaining approval by the Diet of any treaty and informed Mr. Dulles that there was a secret agreement between the Liberal and the People’s Democratic Parties with respect to treaty matters which would ensure approval. Mr. Yoshida gave the impression that the Japanese were so eager for a treaty that they would be willing to approve almost anything. Mr. Dulles re-emphasized the serious nature of the matter and his belief that no treaty would be successful or long lasting which was not understood by and substantially approved by a large majority of the Japanese people. Mr. Dulles, therefore, asked Mr. Yoshida what steps should be taken to consult with leaders of the opposition in order to make certain that they understood what the United States had in mind and were given an opportunity to express their views. While Mr. Yoshida did not seem to be willing to admit the necessity of talking with the opposition leaders, he nevertheless said he would have no objection to such talks but that he wished to caution Mr. Dulles against possible irresponsible statements by politicians. Mr. Dulles made clear that he did not wish to do anything behind Mr. Yoshida’s back and that he would be pleased to have Mr. Yoshida or one of his emissaries present at any meetings with opposition leaders. Mr. Yoshida did not appear to think this necessary."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "rsrIyuOjkU",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "　　In an effort to elicit from Mr. Yoshida definite opinions on some of the major problems connected with the treaty, Mr. Dulles brought up the question of Japan’s security and asked Mr. Yoshida for his views as to how this problem should be dealt with. The Prime Minister said that it was necessary to go very slowly in connection with any possible rearmament of Japan as he foresaw two great obstacles. The first was the danger that any precipitate rearmament would bring back the Japanese militarists who had now gone “underground” and might expose the State to the danger of again being dominated by the military. Mr. Yoshida said that it would be necessary to adopt legislation which would ensure that the military could not take over the Government as in the past and that other steps should be taken to avoid the dangers inherent in the recreation of a military class. The other obstacle which confronted Japan in rearmament was the economic one. Japan was a proud country and did not want to receive charity from anyone but the creation of a military force just at the time when Japan was beginning to get on its feet financially would be a severe strain and probably result in a lower standard of living. Here again, time would be necessary in order to lay a sound foundation for the economic support of any rearmament. Mr. Dulles stated that he recognized these problems but that in the present state of the world it was necessary for all nations that wanted to remain free to make sacrifices. He outlined some of the sacrifices which the people of the United States were making and then inquired whether the Premier was taking the position that the dangers mentioned constituted a reason for doing nothing or merely a recognition of obstacles to be overcome. Mr. Dulles pointed out that, at the present time, free nations of the world through the UN were endeavoring to create a system of collective security and that it was necessary for all who expected to benefit by such a system to make contributions in accordance with their own means and abilities. No one would expect the Japanese contribution at present to be large but it was felt that Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution and a commitment to a general cause of collective security. While Mr. Yoshida did not make a definite answer to Mr. Dulles’ question, the idea of some form of collective security arrangement to which Japan could contribute seemed to appeal to him and he did say that Japan would be willing to make some contribution. No indication, however, was given as to what form such a contribution might take, and it appeared that Mr. Yoshida did not wish at this time to be definitely committed in any manner."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "NDG_blDu7d",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "　　Mr. Yoshida said that the Foreign Office was preparing written comments on the American seven-point program and the suggested agenda of topics to be discussed which had been left with Mr. Yoshida previously and that it was hoped this document would be available tomorrow. He further stated that Mr. Sadao Iguchi was being appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and would be in direct charge of the detailed negotiations on the treaty. Mr. Iguchi would be able to speak for Mr. Yoshida and would be available to talk to Mr. Dulles and members of the Mission at any time after he had been formally installed in office which was expected to take place on January 30th."
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "VGC6yT9LhI",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "　　At the close of the meeting Mr. Yoshida\naccompanied Mr. Dulles to make a courtesy call on General MacArthur and inform\nhim of the general progress which had been made.※2　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "Wpsrg5cQvB",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "　　　　　　　　John\nM. Allison"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "CiN95U2wQd",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "─────────────"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "w1_ufeLuEL",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "※1. In his memorandum of a conversation held\nwith the Prime Minister February 20, Mr. Sebald stated in part:"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "S9j4qF_1Qf",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "“The Prime Minister referred to a remark\nmade during his first interview with Messrs. Dulles and Johnson, to the effect\nthat ‘it would be well if the Japanese could infiltrate into China for the\npurpose of selling democracy.’ He said that upon reconsideration, he felt that\nthis idea might [have] been misunderstood, and he had therefore dropped all\nfurther consideration of this proposal. He particularly wished me to mention\nhis decision in this regard to Ambassador Dulles and Mr. Johnson.” (Toyko Post\nFiles: 320.1 Peace Treaty)"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "CYJuMgwgHN",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "※2.&nbsp;In an attachment headed “Evaluation” and dated January 30, Mr. Sebald wrote in part: “It is my view that the Prime Minister came to yesterday’s conference totally unprepared to discuss detailed provisions and that his remarks were more in the nature of feelers rather than any effort to come to grips with the real problems. The Japanese position will, I believe, be partly disclosed in its memorandum based upon the ‘seven points’ and the ‘agenda’ left with the Prime Minister on January 26th.”"
			}
		}
	],
	"version": "2.26.5"
}