吉田・ダレス会談（1951年1月29日）

1951年1月29日（日本側記録では午後4時、米国側記録では午後4時半）に行われた、吉田茂首相とジョン・F・ダレス（John F. Dulles）対日講和問題担当特使の会談の、日本側、米国側、及び日米両国の記録の対照表である。

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日本側記録

米国側記録

日米対照表

解題

日米対照表

{
	"time": 1680273584501,
	"blocks": [
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			"id": "V5ge4yzgZu",
			"type": "header",
			"data": {
				"text": "吉田・ダレス会談（1951年1月29日）日米記録対照表",
				"level": 2
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "MNKn2DveXp",
			"type": "paragraph",
			"data": {
				"text": "※改行、行詰め、文字詰めを除き、下記対照表に記載している日米各記録の記述の流れは、原資料の通りにしています、"
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "RuDlGqLm7X",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"日本側記録",
						"米国側記録"
					],
					[
						"「1951年1月29日午後の総理ダレス第1次会談メモ」",
						"Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison)"
					],
					[
						"出典：外務省編纂「平和条約の締結に関する調書　Ⅳ」『日本外交文書　平和条約の締結に関する調書　第二冊（Ⅳ・Ⅴ）』付録5、143-144頁。",
						"&nbsp;U. S. Department of State,&nbsp;Foreign Relations of the United States: 1951,&nbsp;Volume Ⅵ, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1, pp827-830.&nbsp;&nbsp;"
					],
					[
						"https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/pdfs/heiwajouyaku2_05.pdf",
						"https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p1/d487"
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "BvDW2iD797",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"日付",
						"Date"
					],
					[
						"1月29日午後4時三井本館で総理とダレス大使と会談せらる。会談の内容左のとおり（総理より伺つたところをメモにしたるもの）",
						"[Tokyo,] January 29, 1951."
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "7TX21OIvOJ",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"出席者",
						"Participants"
					],
					[
						"",
						"Participants: Prime Minister Yoshida, Ambassador Dulles, Ambassador Sebald, Assistant Secretary Johnson and Mr. Allison"
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "JjWo3iTkdp",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"平和条約と占領改革",
						"Peace Treaty and the Occupation reforms"
					],
					[
						"ダレス大使いうには、3年前条約ができれば、日本にとつて今日とはよほど悪条件のものができたろう。今日われわれは勝者の敗者に対する平和条約を作ろうとしているのではない。友邦として条約を考えている。",
						""
					],
					[
						"総理より、講和問題について自分の考えているところは昨年5月申したところと、今も変りない。日本は、アムール・プロプル（自尊心）をきずつけられずして承諾できるような条約を作つてもらいたい。平和条約によつて独立を回復したい。日本の民主化を確立したい。セルフ・サポートの国になりたい。かようになつた上で、日本は自由世界の強化に協力したいのであり、また日本にとつて一番大事な点である日米間における強固な友好関係の確立も可能になると思う。要するに、日本が自由世界の強化に寄与できる国となり、また、日米間に強固な友好関係を打ちたて得るような平和条約を締結したい。",
						"Prime Minister Yoshida called at 4:30 p. m. by appointment for his first interview with Ambassador Dulles on peace treaty problems. After the usual exchange of courtesies Mr. Yoshida stated that there were one or two points he wished to raise. He recalled his statements to Mr. Dulles last June that in dealing with the Japanese people it was necessary to consider their&nbsp;amour-propre"
					],
					[
						"占領中に日本が要請されて実施した各般の改革の如きも随分日本の実情を無視し、また、日本の自立を阻害しているものがある（民法における家族制度の廃止の如き、事業者団体の活動や労働関係の法制の如き）。これらは、占領軍が日本にいる間に占領軍の手で実情に即するよう改廃されることを希望するのも、上述のふたつの目的にでるものである。この要請をマ元帥にだして措置してもらうつもりである。",
						"and in this connection there were certain aspects of ordinances and legislation which had been inspired by the Occupation which, in Mr. Yoshida’s opinion, should be altered prior to concluding a peace treaty. He stated that he was having a list of these matters prepared for presentation to SCAP. Mr. Yoshida specifically mentioned and emphasized the Occupation-inspired revision of the Japanese Civil Code with its consequent effect upon the family system in Japan. Mr. Yoshida recognized the benevolence and good will of much of the Occupation activities but stated matters such as the family system, which were of deep significance to the Japanese, had sometimes been ignored and that if some of the ordinances and legislation affecting such matters could be rescinded it would create a favorable atmosphere for the conclusion of a treaty.&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;"
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "AfMF9jUwd2",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"経済と中国問題",
						"Economy and China"
					],
					[
						"",
						"The Prime Minister then went on to speak of certain economic problems which were of concern and he mentioned particularly necessity for expansion of fishing areas, increase in ship-building and also the necessity of continuing and increasing investments from the United States in Japanese industrial enterprises. Mr. Yoshida spoke of the long term necessity of trading with China, and while he realized that in view of the present communist domination of that country it would not be possible to expect great results in the near future, nevertheless, he believed that in the long run the Chinese would adopt the attitude that “war is war and trade is trade” and that it would be possible for a reasonable degree of trade to take place between Japan and China. In this connection, Mr. Yoshida advanced the thought that Japanese business men, because of their long acquaintance with and experience in China, will be the best fifth column of democracy against the Chinese communists. Mr. Dulles pointed out that many of these economic problems might be difficult to solve because of the interests of the various allied countries concerned. He made clear that many of the Allies would, for one reason or another, want to impose certain restrictions upon Japan. Mr. Yoshida seemed to feel that if the United States adopted a lenient attitude that was all that was necessary and that the other countries would follow suit. In fact, Mr. Yoshida’s whole attitude towards the treaty was that it would be a comparatively simple matter to conclude and that the United States was in a position to put through almost anything it desired."
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "IbYcXd0pbN",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"国会の承認",
						"Diet approval"
					],
					[
						"",
						"In connection with this attitude held by Mr. Yoshida, Mr. Dulles made clear that the treaty was a very serious matter and that it was not enough merely to have the Japanese people go through the form of accepting it but that it should, in fact, be really acceptable to all shades of opinion in Japan. Mr. Dulles, therefore, inquired of Mr. Yoshida what his opinion was as to the position of the opposition parties and what Mr. Yoshida’s opinion was regarding the acceptability of a treaty along the general lines contained in the United States’ seven-point memorandum. Mr. Yoshida seemed to believe that there would be no real difficulty in obtaining approval by the Diet of any treaty and informed Mr. Dulles that there was a secret agreement between the Liberal and the People’s Democratic Parties with respect to treaty matters which would ensure approval. Mr. Yoshida gave the impression that the Japanese were so eager for a treaty that they would be willing to approve almost anything. Mr. Dulles re-emphasized the serious nature of the matter and his belief that no treaty would be successful or long lasting which was not understood by and substantially approved by a large majority of the Japanese people. Mr. Dulles, therefore, asked Mr. Yoshida what steps should be taken to consult with leaders of the opposition in order to make certain that they understood what the United States had in mind and were given an opportunity to express their views. While Mr. Yoshida did not seem to be willing to admit the necessity of talking with the opposition leaders, he nevertheless said he would have no objection to such talks but that he wished to caution Mr. Dulles against possible irresponsible statements by politicians. Mr. Dulles made clear that he did not wish to do anything behind Mr. Yoshida’s back and that he would be pleased to have Mr. Yoshida or one of his emissaries present at any meetings with opposition leaders. Mr. Yoshida did not appear to think this necessary."
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "_A2dvaL2L7",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"日本の安全保障と再軍備",
						"Japan's Security and Rearmament"
					],
					[
						"との趣旨を答えたるに、ダレス大使は、それは、そうであろうが、日本は独立回復ばかりを口にする。独立を回復して自由世界の一員となろうとする以上、日本は、自由世界の強化にいかなる貢献をなそうとするのか。今、米国は世界の自由のために戦つている。自由世界の一員たるべき日本は、この戦にいかなる貢献をなさんとするか。と反問す。",
						"In an effort to elicit from Mr. Yoshida definite opinions on some of the major problems connected with the treaty, Mr. Dulles brought up the question of Japan’s security and asked Mr. Yoshida for his views as to how this problem should be dealt with.&nbsp;"
					],
					[
						"いかなる貢献をなすかといわれるが、日本に再軍備の意ありやを知られたいのであろう。今日の日本はまず独立を回復したい一心であつて、どんな協力をいたすかの質問は過早である。自主独立の国になれるかどうかが、今、問題であつて、それが実現をみた後で初めて、日本がどんな寄与をなせるか、なす心算であるか答えられるのである。再軍備は日本の自立経済を不能にする。対外的にも、日本の再侵略に対する危惧がある。内部的にも軍閥再現の可能性が残つている。再軍備は問題である。ふたつの世界が対立抗争しておる世界において米国は日本を広い意味で米国圏内のうちにインコーポレートして考えてもらいたい。",
						"The Prime Minister said that it was necessary to go very slowly in connection with any possible rearmament of Japan as he foresaw two great obstacles. The first was the danger that any precipitate rearmament would bring back the Japanese militarists who had now gone “underground” and might expose the State to the danger of again being dominated by the military. Mr. Yoshida said that it would be necessary to adopt legislation which would ensure that the military could not take over the Government as in the past and that other steps should be taken to avoid the dangers inherent in the recreation of a military class. The other obstacle which confronted Japan in rearmament was the economic one. Japan was a proud country and did not want to receive charity from anyone but the creation of a military force just at the time when Japan was beginning to get on its feet financially would be a severe strain and probably result in a lower standard of living. Here again, time would be necessary in order to lay a sound foundation for the economic support of any rearmament.&nbsp;"
					],
					[
						"と答え、ダレス大使甚だ不興な気色を示す。",
						"Mr. Dulles stated that he recognized these problems but that in the present state of the world it was necessary for all nations that wanted to remain free to make sacrifices. He outlined some of the sacrifices which the people of the United States were making and then inquired whether the Premier was taking the position that the dangers mentioned constituted a reason for doing nothing or merely a recognition of obstacles to be overcome. Mr. Dulles pointed out that, at the present time, free nations of the world through the UN were endeavoring to create a system of collective security and that it was necessary for all who expected to benefit by such a system to make contributions in accordance with their own means and abilities. No one would expect the Japanese contribution at present to be large but it was felt that Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution and a commitment to a general cause of collective security. While Mr. Yoshida did not make a definite answer to Mr. Dulles’ question, the idea of some form of collective security arrangement to which Japan could contribute seemed to appeal to him and he did say that Japan would be willing to make some contribution. No indication, however, was given as to what form such a contribution might take, and it appeared that Mr. Yoshida did not wish at this time to be definitely committed in any manner."
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "nrxg0MvcWL",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"事務レベル協議について（米国側記録）",
						"working-level talks in the U.S. Record"
					],
					[
						"",
						"Mr. Yoshida said that the Foreign Office was preparing written comments on the American seven-point program and the suggested agenda of topics to be discussed which had been left with Mr. Yoshida previously and that it was hoped this document would be available tomorrow. He further stated that Mr. Sadao Iguchi was being appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and would be in direct charge of the detailed negotiations on the treaty. Mr. Iguchi would be able to speak for Mr. Yoshida and would be available to talk to Mr. Dulles and members of the Mission at any time after he had been formally installed in office which was expected to take place on January 30th."
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "c7wEw8APLB",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"マッカーサー元帥との会談",
						"In talks with General MacArthur"
					],
					[
						"マ元帥にふたりで挨拶にゆく時間となつて、総司令部に行く。総理より、マ元帥に対し、今、ダレス大使は甚だ困つた質問をして予を苦しめておる。自主独立を実現するため平和条約を希望する日本に、いかなる寄与を自由世界に対し日本はなすつもりなりやと責めらる。といえるに、マ元帥は微笑してダレス大使を顧み、自由世界が今日日本に求むるものは、軍事力であつてはならない。そういうことは実際できない。日本は、軍事生産力を有する。労働力を有する。これに資材を供給して、フルにこの生産力を活用し、これを自由世界の力の増強に活用すべきである。と大いにダレス大使説得につとめ、これから会談中意見対立して困難な場合にたちいたる場合には、いつも仲介役をつとむべし。総理の考はよく承知しおれり。という。",
						"At the close of the meeting Mr. Yoshida accompanied Mr. Dulles to make a courtesy call on General MacArthur and inform him of the general progress which had been made."
					]
				]
			}
		},
		{
			"id": "fMAR7WgYZM",
			"type": "table",
			"data": {
				"withHeadings": true,
				"content": [
					[
						"事務レベル協議について(日本側記録）",
						"working-level talks in Japan’s Records"
					],
					[
						"なお三井本館での会談の際、総理よりダレス大使に、先日受け取りし議題のうちには、技術的な事項も相当あり、これらは、既に多少研究もいたしたり。わが方の見解を書き物にまとめて、明30日午後6時に御手許にとどくべし。（なお、この書き物は、その前にマ元帥にとどける必要あり）また、国会開会の折にてもあり自分によんどころなき支障あるときは井口次官において代理としてお話しすることとすべし。ということに打ち合わせおきたり。",
						""
					],
					[
						"　　　　　　　　（以上）",
						"　　　　　　　　John M. Allison"
					]
				]
			}
		}
	],
	"version": "2.26.5"
}