(This is the tentative English translation of the text of the recommendation. The original Japanese version is accessivle from here)

ROLES Policy Recommendation on the Middle East

“Advocating for Japan to Advance a more Regional Approach to the Middle East”

December 19, 2025

Recommendation 1:  Establishing the Middle East Regional Policy Division at MOFA to address regional international politics in the Middle East in an integrated and comprehensive manner

Recommendation 2: Integrating Japan’s Middle East regional diplomacy with Southeast Asia regional diplomacy

Recommendation 3: Building multi-layered, multi-faceted, and multi-channel approaches for Japanese diplomacy toward the Middle East region

The situation surrounding the Middle East has undergone rapid changes in recent years, including the decline of Western influence, the rise of regional powers, shifts in energy structures, and the rapid development and adoption of AI and strategic science and technology. International politics led by major countries within the Middle East region are actively unfolding, and a regional order is taking shape. How should Japanese diplomacy respond to this?

In 2024, the RCAST Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies (ROLES) at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST) of the University of Tokyo convened the inaugural “Japan-Middle East Strategic Dialogue” in Amman, Jordan. The event brought together researchers, politicians, bureaucrats, international organization representatives, NGO members, and journalists primarily from the Middle East, but also from Africa, Europe, and Japan. In 2025, it held a closed-door meeting, the “Aqaba Security and Strategy Forum,” in July. Then, in November, it expanded the scale and held the “Second Japan-Middle East Strategic Dialogue” in Amman. There, it directly heard the latest trends in Middle Eastern international politics from local experts, conveyed Japan's position, and participated in the discussions. Furthermore, Japan deepened its cooperative relationship with a think tank in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). In September 2024, it co-hosted an international conference on AI and security in Tokyo, and in December 2025, it co-hosted an international symposium in Abu Dhabi. These events facilitated discussions on the Gulf region's strategic investments in cutting-edge science and technology related to security, which it is advancing with global leadership. 

As a result, we propose the following three points of recommendation to Japan's diplomatic authorities.

Recommendation 1:  Establishing the Middle East Regional Policy Division at MOFA to address regional international politics in the Middle East in an integrated and comprehensive manner

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the “European Policy Division” at the European Affairs Bureau which treats Europe as a region rather than a collection of individual countries, and the “Regional Policy Division” at the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau which grapples with Southeast Asia as a region. Similarly, a “Middle East Regional Policy Division” should be established within the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau. 

Of course, while Europe has the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Middle East lacks institutionalized regional organizations or multilateral frameworks serving as the primary venues or mechanisms for regional politics. Although the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) exist, they do not encompass most Middle Eastern countries or regions, nor do they constitute the main stage for regional international politics. The absence of a division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicated to the entire Middle East likely stems largely from the lack of corresponding institutionalized regional organizations or multilateral frameworks. However, the absence of a department that views the Middle East region not merely as a collection of bilateral relationships—a collection of “points” and ‘lines’—but as a “plane,” within the interrelationships of the region's major powers, is precisely what constitutes a blind spot in Japan's Middle East policy. 

This is because regional international politics in the Middle East are not conducted through institutionalized bodies or explicitly codified rules. Middle Eastern regional politics exist within the constantly shifting multilateral equilibrium among major powers, shaped not by institutions or written rules, but by ad hoc negotiations between leaders. This dynamic has become increasingly clear and autonomous in recent years. Once, the Middle East region and its nations were under strong U.S. influence, with the regional order shaped according to U.S. policy. However, with the U.S. retreating from its Middle East engagement, the current dynamic has shifted to one where multiple regional powers in the Middle East compete while taking the lead. These regional powers and influential states and forces are not merely in conflict; they are creating the Middle East regional order through complex mutual balancing.

The major regional powers, key actors in Middle Eastern politics, include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. We can also include smaller yet influential nations like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, which have risen through vigorous investment and utilization of diplomacy, media, and cutting-edge science and technology. Japan has historically focused its efforts on building bilateral relationships with these nations. While valuable, a collection of bilateral ties alone cannot evolve into a coherent regional policy. Unless Japan engages as a significant extra-regional actor within the informal multilateral spaces unfolding in the Middle East, its importance to partner nations within these bilateral relationships will diminish.

The outbreak and escalation of conflicts in the Middle East, their resolution, regional stability, and prosperity all emerge within the multilateral relationships among the region's major powers, key states, and influential forces. Japan must detect the latest movements within these relationships, pool wisdom collectively, and identify the equilibrium points in regional international politics that favor Japan's national interests. Japan possesses the potential to do so. The problem is that Japan currently lacks the means to realize this potential and meet the expectations of countries in the region. To institutionally enable diplomacy not just with individual Middle Eastern countries but with the “region” itself, Japan should establish a Middle East Regional Policy Division. This would clarify the policy targets and responsible entities, and build a framework capable of responding flexibly to rapidly evolving situations.

The “Japan-Middle East Strategic Dialogue,” initiated by ROLES in 2024 and held in Amman in November 2025, serves as an experiment in Japan's Track II approach to “Middle East regional diplomacy” and aims to demonstrate a model.

Recommendation 2: Integrating Japan’s Middle East regional diplomacy with Southeast Asia regional diplomacy

Middle East regional diplomacy, developed from the above perspectives, can be more effectively advanced by integrating it with Japan's longstanding regional diplomacy toward Southeast Asia. Japan has already established deep bilateral and multilateral ties with Southeast Asian nations, contributing to the formation of regional order and stability. Japan has been directly and indirectly involved from the outset in regional institutions centered on Southeast Asia, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as in the regional integration promoted by these institutions. Japan has already accumulated experience in Southeast Asia in contributing to the creation of mechanisms for regional stabilization and confidence-building.

By linking its Middle East regional policy with its regional diplomacy and policy in Southeast Asia, Japanese diplomacy may find a new path forward. The shift in the center of global power, rooted in Asia's economic development, is altering the relationship between Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Muslim nations in Southeast Asia are no longer merely the periphery within the Islamic world centered on the Middle East. Should Japan not leverage the diplomatic assets it has built in Southeast Asia for the Middle East? In doing so, it must reassess its own Southeast Asian regional diplomacy, making revisions already rendered inevitable by changing times – revisions that place greater emphasis on Southeast Asia's autonomy and dynamism.

The “East Asia Cooperation for Palestine Development” (CEAPAD) ministerial meeting, held in Kuala Lumpur in July 2025 for the first time in seven years, should be redefined and reinforced as a key junction point for Japan's Middle East diplomacy and Southeast Asia diplomacy. Though bearing the name “East Asia,” CEAPAD is effectively a framework for Japan to jointly support Palestine with willing ASEAN nations. Launched under Japan's leadership in 2013, it held ministerial meetings in Tokyo that year, Jakarta the following year, and Bangkok in 2018, but saw little notable activity thereafter. Redefining this framework would revitalize both Middle East diplomacy and Southeast Asia diplomacy. 

In the era when efforts for Middle East peace were dominated by the US and Europe, the Japan-Southeast Asia cooperation framework for Palestine support likely carried greater significance as a means of supporting and contributing to US and European, particularly US, Middle East policy.

The pronounced pro-Palestinian stance of Muslim nations in Southeast Asia historically tended to hinder cooperation from major Western countries toward the Japan-Southeast Asia Palestinian support framework. Consequently, the CEAPAD framework was not widely regarded as particularly successful or promising, and its importance within Japan's overall foreign policy was not necessarily high. However, with the development and growing political and diplomatic importance of individual Southeast Asian nations and the region as a whole, coupled with Southeast Asia's increasing significance in international diplomacy and security concerning the Middle East, Japan's regional diplomacy in Southeast Asia is being redefined as a powerful asset within its Middle East diplomacy, thereby becoming a greater asset.

It was symbolic that Indonesian President Prabowo attended the international summit in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, on October 13, 2025, aimed at ending the fighting in the Gaza Strip, alongside leaders from leading Middle Eastern countries like Turkey's President Erdogan and Qatar's Emir Tamim, as well as leaders from major Western nations. President Prabowo has repeatedly stated Indonesia's readiness to contribute to multinational stabilization missions and peacekeeping forces in Gaza, positioning the country as a potential key player alongside major Middle Eastern powers in achieving Middle East peace.

An era is dawning where not only the US, Europe, and Japan, but also Southeast Asia will engage proactively and take the lead in international efforts for Middle East peace. This shift heightens the significance of revitalizing CEAPAD. The Middle East also desires strengthened ties with Southeast Asia. Reactivating and redefining the CEAPAD framework, positioning Japan between the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and drawing out Southeast Asia's autonomy will enhance Japan's presence in the Middle East. Rather than Japan taking the lead, it is essential to clearly shift to an approach where Japan leverages Southeast Asia's strength, deepens its level of engagement in the Middle East, and achieves through cooperation with Southeast Asia what Japan cannot accomplish alone.

Southeast Asia has maintained and asserted positions on the Palestinian issue distinct from those of the West. This includes criticism of the current Middle East situation created by the international Middle East politics the West itself pioneered. Now that the West can no longer exert strong leadership in the Middle East, the initiative of the region's major regional powers, coupled with Southeast Asia's autonomy, becomes a crucial key to Middle East peace. Untapped potential lies in connecting the vitality of these two regions through Japan's regional diplomacy toward the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

By respecting Southeast Asia as an equal partner and cooperating with it to engage in the Middle East, Japan can revitalize both its Middle East regional policy and its Southeast Asia regional policy.

Recommendation 3: Building multi-layered, multi-faceted, and multi-channel approaches for Japanese diplomacy toward the Middle East region

In the current Middle East, Israel, possessing superior military and diplomatic power, is rapidly increasing its influence, creating an imbalance in the regional equilibrium. Fewer countries now perceive Iran as a threat; instead, more recognize an overly powerful Israel as the problem, driving efforts to rebuild balance. This has linked to U.S. efforts to promote a Palestinian peace plan that imposes some restraint on Israel. 

Shifts in equilibrium driven by shifting alliances among major regional powers have become a key element of Middle Eastern international politics. For Japan to respond to these complex dynamics, it requires not only official “Track I” government-to-government diplomacy, but also multi-layered, multi-faceted, and multi-dimensional diplomatic channels. It is desirable to build flexible information exchange channels through strategic dialogue at the expert level (“Track II”) to underpin official Track I diplomacy.

Why is Track II necessary? The constant realignment of the balance among regional powers in the Middle East is extremely fast-moving and largely consists of changes in informal relationships. This information is only transmitted informally until it becomes overtly public. Information like President Trump's Gaza peace plan circulates underground within international expert networks until it suddenly surfaces. Without access to this information, immediate response when it surfaces is impossible.

Japan currently cannot be said to have access to the informal networks surrounding Middle East international politics. For example, when an international conference for Gaza peace was suddenly convened in Egypt in October 2025, Western nations responded immediately by sending leaders. Japan, however, sent only an ambassador, not even a minister. While Japan's geographical distance from the Middle East and the complexity of domestic coordination are certainly factors, it is also likely that Western nations had obtained prior underground information and prepared accordingly. One purpose of ROLES organizing the “Japan-Middle East Strategic Dialogue” and attempting to participate in discussion platforms elsewhere in the Middle East is to create channels to access such informal information networks. It is precisely the accumulation of such efforts that will lead to the establishment of multi-layered, multi-faceted, and multiple channels in regional diplomacy in the Middle East.

The Japanese government should recognize this importance and actively work to expand these channels.