[ROLES Conference Papers] [日本語版]
This paper is submitted to ROLES for the Panel I  "Japan’s Role in the Middle East Security Architecture," Panel II "Rising Tension in the Red Sea: An Evolving Role for Japan" and Panel IV "Navigating the Middle East Refugee Crisis – Japan’s Humanitarian Assistance to the Middle East" of the 1st Japan-Middle East Strategic Dialogue on May 12 and 13 in Amman, organized and hosted by the Center for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan in cooperation with ROLES. Views expressed are author's own, not representing any conclusion or consensus of the conference or views of the organizations.

What Japan Should Pursue in the Face of the Gaza Crisis

 

Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

 

It is imperative for Japan to sincerely consider what it can and should pursue in the face of the Gaza crisis. The situation in Gaza is a tragedy for all of humanity. Japan has a long history of engagement with the Israel-Palestinian conflict, albeit modestly, through overseas assistance, diplomatic channels in the region, and the United Nations. Given Japan’s deep concern, it must seriously examine how it can offer constructive efforts to improve the situation and bring peace.

              Identifying effective ways to make positive contributions to people in Gaza, let alone solving the complex issues of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, is undoubtedly challenging. However, it is not appropriate at this moment to look away from the ongoing crisis in Gaza and vaguely suggest that Japan should be ready to contribute only at the post-conflict reconstruction stage. Those suffering in Gaza cannot afford to think about the future while enduring present hardships. Ultimately, they seek peace, dignity, and self-determination. We should not ignore these obvious needs, despite the difficulty in achieving them.

              Discussing the Gaza crisis now requires significant analytical effort from all of us. Japan’s traditional stance on the Israel-Palestinian conflict has not yet been abandoned, but it may need to be adjusted in light of recent developments. Therefore, I will first summarize Japan’s traditional stance on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Then, I will highlight three structural changes that have become evident during the ongoing Gaza crisis. Finally, I will offer some thoughts on the expected stance Japan should take in response to the crisis. 

 

 

Japan is not a highly visible and vocal actor in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Its stance is always a product of careful diplomatic considerations. The basic structure of Japan’s diplomatic concerns relevant to the Israel-Palestinian conflict consists of two pillars: dependence on the United States for national security and dependence on Arab countries for oil. Japan’s policy toward the Middle East is typically explained as balancing these two pillars.

              On one hand, Japan’s dependence on the United States for national security shapes its relationship with Israel. Japan does not have a military alliance mechanism except the US-Japan security treaty. While the US has many military allies, Japan has indirect relations with the other US allies in Asia, Oceania, and Europe. Israel is not a country with which the US conducts joint operations. However, the fact that the US regards Israel as a special ally inevitably affects Japan’s stance on the Middle East. over the past decade, particularly since the time of the second Abe administration, security-related cooperation between Japan and Israel has solidly developed. Japanese policy-makers tend to regard Israel as highly advanced regarding anti-terrorism measures, cybersecurity, intelligence, and other areas. Currently, Japan’s Defense Ministry is seeking to purchase weapons like lethal drones from Israel.

              On the other hand, Japan is heavily dependent on oil imported from Arab countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait provide more than 90% of Japan’s oil imports. This dependence necessitates that Japan considers the sentiments of Arab people in formulating its policies toward the Middle East. 

              The two pillars constantly urge Japan to balance them in its foreign policy toward the Middle East. When the peace process for the Israel-Palestinian conflict follows a US-led framework, such as the Oslo Agreement in 1993, Japan clearly supports and promotes this path. Otherwise, Japan struggles to balance the two pillars. Japan has voted for a ceasefire in Gaza and the membership of the Palestine State in the UN Security Council and General Assembly, despite vigorous opposition from Israel and the US. However, Japan avoids blaming and alienating Israel. If Japan commits itself to “the rule of law of international society” by supporting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it should condemn Israel’s actions in Gaza, despite US attempts to defend Israel. Otherwise, it is as if a “rules-based international order” is applicable only when the phrase is used together with the US against Russia and China.

              Whether this balancing act is desirable or not, Japan may need to adjust it due to the structural changes highlighted by the ongoing Gaza crisis. I will outline three significant points at the Palestinian, regional, and global levels that Japan and other stakeholders in Gaza need to consider.

 

 

The first significant change highlighted by the ongoing Gaza crisis is the increasing separation between Gaza and the West Bank. These two occupied territories are physically separate but have historically been considered a single entity in the context of the Palestinian issue. The inhabitants of both territories are Palestinians, including refugees and their descendants. The unity of Gaza and the West Bank has always been a foundational assumption in the Palestinian issue. The “Two-State-Solution,” represented by the Oslo Agreement and supported by most UN member countries, including Japan, is based upon the assumption that Gaza and the West Bank form a single entity. 

              However, the two territories have experienced very different fates. Gaza suffers from widespread killing and destruction, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties, while the West Bank faces oppression and harassment by Israeli soldiers and settlers. Hamas is predominant in Gaza, whereas the Palestinian Authority, though still active, is largely disregarded in the West Bank. Gaza attracts worldwide attention, while the West Bank is treated separately and marginally. Maintaining the integrity of Gaza and the West Bank will become even more challenging after the ongoing crisis.

              The factor of the increasing separation of the Palestinian territories should be carefully considered when pursuing long-term peaceful solutions to the Palestinian conflict.

 

 

The dynamics of regional politics has changed significantly. The Gaza crisis is no longer just a confrontation between Israelis and Arabs. Regionally, Iran’s support for Hamas and pro-Hamas elements outside of Gaza, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, is prominent. The central governments of Syria and Iraq generally maintain amicable with Iran. Turkey is one of the harshest critics of Israel and does not necessarily confront Iran. The impact of the ongoing Gaza crisis at the regional level extends beyond Israel and Arab countries.

              The process of the Abraham Accords seemed to progress again before October 7, 2023. Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, and Sudan signed accords with Israel, recognizing its sovereignty in the last several months of US President Trump’s term. It was anticipated before October 7, 2023, that Saudi Arabia would follow suit. This indicated that a considerable number of Arab countries in the region were becoming more amicable with Israel. While such attitudes toward Israel are now more problematic than before October 7, 2023, Arab countries are no longer the most hostile to Israel. Instead, the overall structure shows that Iran, as Israel’s major foe, extending its network around Israel. Russia, with its UN Security Council veto power, seems inclined to get closer to Iran. Turkey does not have an incentive to confront Iran. To the east, Iran does not have bad relationships with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, nor India.

              This changing dynamism of regional politics should be carefully considered when pursuing long-term peaceful solutions to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

 

The ongoing Gaza crisis dramatically illustrates the confrontation between two narratives about the current state of international society at the global level. On one hand, Israel, with the backing of the US, seeks to advance the narrative of the “War on Terror.” Israel maintains that its military operation aims to eliminate Hamas as a terrorist group, a view supported by the US and a considerable number of Western countries. They aspire to believe that Israel is fighting the Global War on Terror, often labeling critics of their actions as supporters of Hamas, implying that anyone who does not support Israel is aligned with Hamas.

              On the other hand, most countries view the ongoing Gaza crisis through the lens of anti-colonial struggles. South Africa, in its effort to appeal to the International Court of Justice for Israel’s breach of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, drew parallels to its experience of Apartheid to explain its interest in the Gaza crisis. 
No country among the former colonies of European Empires in Asia and Africa support Israel’s position. This narrative fosters anti-Western sentiments and seems to bolster efforts by BRICS to challenge the dominance of the US dollar against the G7-led Western camp.

              Even within the US and European countries, student protest movements have risen around the competition between these two global narratives. Students protesting Israel’s military actions in Gaza believe that Israel is committing genocide as a colonial power over Gaza, driven by racism. They view the US and other supportive governments, as well as the universities backing Israel, as colonial collaborators in the genocide. It is symbolic that these protests began at Columbia University, where Edward Said, author of “Orientalism”, was affiliated for 40 years. The harsh repression of students by authorities in the US and some European countries seems to stem from a biased perception that the students are terrorist supporters. Authorities often resort to excessively brutal measures to suppress non-violent students and faculty members, as if they are conducting the War on Terror against terrorists.

 

 

Japan needs to adjust its traditional framework in light of the above-mentioned structural changes. First, it should not hesitate to be involved in a peace process proceeding separately for Gaza. This does not mean that the West Bank should be ignored or the idea of a Palestine state abandoned. However, if the introduction of two separate peace processes is expected to lead to the realization of the overall Palestinian State, it should be pursued.

              At the regional level, Japan should facilitate an international forum that includes countries like Turkey. Ideally, Iran’s role should be recognized. Japan should encourage other major Islamic countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, to take active roles. Japan may also help encourage China, India, and Russia to participate in the peace process. A broader international forum to plan, implement, and monitor a possible peace process is highly required. No single country qualifies as a mediator and guarantor given the difficulty and complexity of the Gaza crisis.

              At the global level, Japan should make every effort to promote the rule of law in international society without a double-standard. Japan should explicitly share the value of the rule of law with non-Western countries regarding Gaza. By supporting the ICJ and the ICC, Japan should ensure that the narrative of the rule of law based on international law applies to Gaza. Unless Japan positively and constructively contributes to these narrative struggles, it risks losing its presence in international society.

              Japan’s economic power is declining, and its budget deficits are serious. Japan needs to stop superficially pledging possible donations if it seriously intends to contribute to a peace process. This also applies to other traditional donor countries in the West. Their GDP share in the world economy is declining, and the budgets for UN operations and aid agencies are shrinking. Japan must act as a catalyst in navigating non-traditional OECD DAC countries in Asia, particularly in a broader international forum for Gaza.

              Japan’s potential lies in its ability to promote such a broader international forum as a functional catalyst among Western and non-Western countries. The new peace process should be flexible regarding Gaza, open to new partners, and free from the deadlock narrative of the War on Terror. Japan alone cannot do much, but it can achieve more with partners. It is in Japan’s national interest to work with various partners for the sake of the people in Gaza.