Koki Shigenoi, Collaborative Researcher at ROLES, published an essay titled “[How Long Will the Iran War Last? 6] The Geoeconomics of Connectivity: The Emerging Structural Reason Why This War Does Not End” in Shincho QUE’s Foresight section on October 1, 2026.

The essay argues that the Iran War is shifting from a conflict centered on the Strait of Hormuz to a broader struggle over “connectivity and blockade” across sea, air, and land. The maritime routes, air corridors, and land connections surrounding Iran have not been completely closed. Yet none of these corridors remains as open as it once was. The essay examines how incomplete and selective forms of blockade can persist over time, turning crisis into a normalized condition.

Building on the previous essay on the aftermath of the Islamabad Agreement, Shigenoi analyzes the next phase of the conflict. The earlier essay argued that the agreement did not end the war, but transformed it from a war over ceasefire conditions into a war over the interpretation of the text itself. This essay examines how, after Washington signaled that it had no intention of returning to the Islamabad framework, the United States moved beyond maritime pressure and began to restrict Iran’s air corridors through sanctions.

A key focus of the essay is the emergence of what Shigenoi calls an air blockade by sanctions. This is not a classical air blockade enforced by fighter aircraft. Rather, it operates by exposing third-country companies and airports to secondary sanctions if they provide Iranian airlines with landing services, refueling, ticketing, maintenance, or ground support. The purpose is not necessarily to close Iranian airspace completely, but to create a situation in which every Iranian flight forces airports, fuel suppliers, maintenance companies, and ticketing agents to calculate sanctions risk.

The essay also considers the growing importance of land corridors as air routes narrow and maritime pressure continues. Land routes cannot fully replace maritime trade. Yet as Iran faces pressure at sea and in the air, its remaining overland connections acquire greater strategic significance. Corridors through Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan are particularly important for Iran’s continued connection to the outside world. Shigenoi argues that the essence of a land blockade is not necessarily the complete closure of borders, but the gradual weakening of customs, banking, insurance, rail, and trucking services through sanctions risk.

At the same time, the essay emphasizes that air and land blockades are not merely quiet instruments of pressure. They can also become triggers for military escalation. Airports that refuse Iranian flights, bases from which U.S. aircraft operate, ports that support blockade operations, and companies that deny refueling, maintenance, insurance, or ticketing services may all be perceived by Tehran as parts of a U.S.-led blockade network. As a result, airports, military bases, ports, and the Strait of Hormuz itself could become targets of retaliation or coercive signaling.

The essay stresses that the Strait of Hormuz remains Iran’s most important strategic lever. Iran does not need to impose a total blockade in order to escalate the situation. Mine-laying, inspections, warnings against specific vessels, drone attacks, or the inducement of route changes would be sufficient to destabilize the Strait again and impose substantial costs on the Gulf states and the global economy.

The essay further explains why the war has no clear exit through the concept of U.S. “pressure without victory.” The United States has not achieved a decisive victory, and Iran has not surrendered. Nevertheless, Washington appears to be treating the war not as an immediate liability that must be ended, but as a controllable policy instrument whose intensity and timing can be adjusted. Ammunition shortages remain a constraint, but they are becoming a manageable constraint on the tempo of pressure rather than a decisive force pushing the United States toward a ceasefire.

In conclusion, the essay argues that the Iran War has moved from a war over the interpretation of an agreement to a geoeconomic struggle over connectivity and blockade across sea, air, and land. None of these domains is fully closed, but none is fully open in the way it once was. Precisely because blockades are incomplete, they can last. Precisely because they are selective, they can normalize crisis. The United States, Gulf oil-producing states, airlines, insurers, shipping companies, and energy-consuming countries are all beginning to adapt to this unstable condition of partial blockade.

The essay also identifies the limits of “Pax Iranica.” Iran retains the power to prevent a Middle Eastern order from being built without it. Yet this veto power has not translated into a stable regional order. Instead, the war is seeping into the everyday infrastructure of society and markets: straits, airports, borders, insurance, stockpiles, contracts, and fuel prices. The Iran War is becoming a condition in which unstable blockade is normalized and all actors increasingly struggle to identify an end point.

The full essay is available below.

The Geoeconomics of Connectivity: The Emerging Structural Reason Why This War Does Not End
https://que.dailyshincho.jp/node/21276/