Ryo Nakai
(Professor, RCAST, The University of Tokyo)

 

On October 3, 2026, parliamentary elections were held in Latvia Saeima (100 seats), one of the three Baltic states. While the leading ruling party secured a landslide victory, emerging Russian-speaking parties and oligarch-backed parties also made significant gains in seats. The implications of these results are not straightforward.

Latvia is situated on the eastern edge of the EU and NATO and is on the front lines of security tensions with Russia. Known for its enthusiastic support of Ukraine and its pro-EU and pro-NATO stance, this victory is often reported as a “victory for the pro-EU camp.” For readers in East Asia, the situation is not entirely irrelevant, given that Latvia is a small country facing off against an authoritarian superpower. However, local elections are not contested solely on the basis of foreign policy and security; the results also reflect a range of domestic issues. What forces are competing in Latvia, and what do these results imply? Below, I will discuss an overview of the major political parties, the pre-election landscape, the election results, and their implications.

 

Latvia’s electoral politics have long been known as among the most volatile and polarized in Europe. The last general election in 2022 saw a major upheaval in which all parties ranked first through fourth in parliament disappeared from the scene. Although 14 political groups are running in this election, the major political forces can broadly be divided into three or four categories: (1) Latvian-based parties ranging from center-right to conservative; (2) parties whose support base consists of Russian speakers; and (3) oligarch-backed parties.

 

Among the center-right to conservative Latvian political parties, the pro-EU, pro-NATO “New Unity (JV)” has long held a prominent position. Amid the intense fluctuations of Latvian party politics, “New Unity” held the position of head of government for just under 12 of the 16 years between 2010 and 2026. However, in May of this year, the then-Siliņa administration clashed with its coalition partners over responsibility for a drone crash in eastern Latvia;  after failing to reach a compromise, the government collapsed.

Kulbergs, endorsed by the “United List (AS),” took over after that. Although he does not have long-term political experience and, strictly speaking, is not a member of the “United List,” his forthright manner of speaking has won him popularity, and the party’s approval rating has actually risen since Kulbergs became prime minister. Although the United List itself was formed in 2022, it is a coalition of political parties—including the “Green Party,” founded in 1990, and regional parties such as the “Liepāja Party” and the “Regional Alliance,” both of which have been in existence for over a decade—and thus includes many experienced politicians. It possesses a level of organizational structure that prevents it from being simply dismissed as a populist party.

It should be noted that the “United List” was formed primarily by factions that had split from the “Green and Farmers’ Union (ZZS).” As its name suggests, the Green and Farmers’ Union enjoys strong support in rural areas (note that, generally speaking, in the Baltic region and parts of Eastern Europe, “Green” implies not left-wing or liberal, but rather conservative and national). In terms of economic policy, it leans slightly toward the center-left and also exhibits some Euroskeptic tendencies.

The most conservative party is the “National Alliance (NA),” which has also participated in many past coalition governments. It is particularly conservative on family values, sexual norms, and immigration policy; around July of this year, with an eye toward the upcoming election, it expressed strong views on immigration/border crossing issues. While it occupies the far right of the political spectrum, unlike far-right parties in Western Europe, it has absolutely no pro-Russian leanings. Many of the country’s successive governments have been led by these center-right and conservative forces.

 

Approximately one-quarter to one-third of Latvia’s population speaks Russian as their native language. For a long time, the political party “Harmony (SDPS),” which drew its support base from these Russian speakers, served as the leading party in Latvian elections. However, the party’s popularity plummeted due to a scandal involving its leader and collapsed during the 2022 general election, partly as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the previous general election in October 2022, several emerging political forces competed for the votes of this fragmented Russian-speaking population.

It is important to note that the Russian-speaking population consists of the descendants of people who came to the country—such as technical migrants during the Soviet era—with Russian as their lingua franca. As this group includes a significant number of people with roots in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, they do not necessarily have strong ties to the current Russian Federation; while they possess a certain sense of belonging to Latvia, they also maintain a distinct identity as Russian speakers and hold historical narratives they wish to value.

Ahead of the 2026 election, the party “Sovereign Power (SV)” is succeeding in rallying support from this demographic. Its leader, Stepanenko, was originally a member of “Harmony” but left the party immediately after the 2018 general election and founded “Sovereign Power” in 2022. Initially, it was a fringe group waging its own campaign based on anti-vaccine sentiments and conspiracy theories, and it failed to win a single seat in the previous 2022 election. However, by strategically adjusting its platform and recruiting former “Harmony” lawmakers, it has strengthened its organizational capabilities (precisely, it formed a party alliance with “Youth Alliance” ). The party has taken a reluctant stance on supporting Ukraine and has maintained an ambiguous position on Russia’s annexation of Crimea; in this regard, its stance is incompatible with that of the aforementioned Latvian center-right conservative parties.

The “For Stability! (ST!)” Party—a political force that could be described as a conspiracy-theory YouTubers/TikTokers—won seats in the last election with the support of some Russian-speaking voters. However, it has since faced challenges, including antisocial remarks and behavior by its lawmakers, allegations of treason and incitement by its leader, Rosļikov, and his subsequent flight to Belarus. Founder Rosļikov campaigned from his refuge in Belarus, reaching out to voters via TikTok and Instagram.

 

The “Latvia First (LPV)” party, led by Šlesers, was at the center of the storm in this election. Šlesers is arguably the last surviving member of the three major oligarchic figures that have long dominated Latvia, and he is a figure who has drawn both praise and criticism—though the criticism far outweighs the praise. He was a figure who helped drive the economic development of modern Latvia and held several key positions beginning in the 1990s; however, in 2011, the then-president even went so far as to dissolve parliament and call for a referendum—on which he staked his own position—in an attempt to remove his influence (commonly known as “Decree No. 2” (Rikojums nr. 2)). Although Šlesers had stepped away from politics for a time, he launched “Latvia First” ahead of the 2022 election and made a comeback by deliberately emulating Donald Trump’s style. He enjoys a certain degree of popularity among those who are nostalgic for Latvia as it was before 2010, as well as among those who are largely unaware of (or indifferent to) Šlesers’s notorious past. Furthermore, because he champions an anti-establishment platform, he maintains a certain distance from the EU and NATO.

Finally, as a political party that does not fit into any of aforementioned these categories, there is the left-wing party “Progressive (PRO).” It is a non-Russian-speaking left-wing party that had long been absent from Latvian politics, and it has taken a strongly liberal stance on social issues such as same-sex marriage and minorities’ rights. Although it was part of the coalition government under Prime Minister Siliņa, it clashed with New Unity over the responsibilities of the Minister of Defense, a position held by the party, and was forced out of the government; this clash triggered the collapse of the Siliņa

 

The most notable trend in pre-election support was the rise of Sovereign Power, an anti-establishment party whose main base is Russian-speaking residents, and Latvia First, led by Šlesers, a notorious oligarch. While both means gains for the opposition, the United List has simultaneously maintained high levels of support, so this trend cannot be dismissed as merely a manifestation of distrust toward the incumbent government.

Sovereign Power and Latvia First are often discussed in the same breath. However, the styles of their election campaigns are somewhat contrasting. While “Latvia First” centered its campaign on the charisma of its leader, Šlesers, and a social media-based campaign, Sovereign Power, while also utilizing social media, waged what is known as a grassroots campaign —featuring relentless and passionate canvassing and street rallies in suburban housing complexes. It is inappropriate to explain the growth in support for Sovereign Power solely through Stepanenko’s personal popularity or conspiracy-theory-based appeals; viewing it that way risks missing the essence of the matter. Given the existence of the more radical and clearly dangerous “For Stability!”, it is likely that voters see Latvia First and Sovereign Power—while exhibiting somewhat pro-Russian tendencies— relatively “better” by comparison.

The parties that waged election campaigns backed by substantial financial expenses—in descending order of campaign spending—were the “United List,” the “Green Farmers’ Union,” and “Latvia First.” Fundamentally, more than half of these funds were spent on outdoor advertising; indeed, based on the author’s impressions during a visit to Latvia during the election period, the most prevalent outdoor advertisements were the massive billboards of the United List (and Kulbergs) (Figure 1).

 

Political parties also focused heavily on election campaigning via social media. In the previous 2022 election, there was a rise in political forces—such as conspiracy theory-oriented YouTubers—who used a mix of sensational videos on TikTok, and there were significant concerns as Russian influence was suggested to be behind this trend. For this election as well, there was vigilance regarding potential interference from Russia and Belarus, but reports indicate that no notable influence operations have been observed. However, research has shown that when asking large language models (LLMs) to evaluate various political parties and politicians, the responses vary significantly depending on whether the question is posed in Latvian or Russian. It remains unclear to what extent the Russian-language training data used by these AI systems has been intentionally programmed to incorporate narratives favorable to the Russian government.

As the election campaign intensified, several issues emerged as major points of contention. While foreign policy and national security remained one such issue, others included immigration and the admission of international students from third countries; strengthening control of the eastern border and measures to address the “refugee crisis”; delays, funding issues, and corruption surrounding the Rail Baltica project—which has been ongoing for nearly 20 years; responsibility for AirBaltic’s bankruptcy and bailout, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention—which led to large-scale demonstrations last year—and same-sex marriage, as well as opposition to and negotiations over large-scale wind farm projects… and so on. Just before voting day, it became a major issue that Sovereign Power leader Stepanenko had received substantial financial support from his father, who resides in Russia; it was also revealed that his father’s business had been supporting the Russian military, sparking widespread controversy (Foreign Minister Braže of New Unity designated Stepanenko’s father as persona non grata just before voting day).

 

Which demographic groups support each political party? Here, as evidence illustrating the reality of support, I present data from a survey I conducted jointly with the local public opinion research firm SKDS.

Differences in language use are strongly reflected in differences in party support (Figure 2). As expected, Sovering Power, Latvia First, and For Stability! enjoy strong support among Russian-speaking residents. What is noteworthy is that Latvia First—a party that does not prominently emphasize its ethnic identity—is the most supported among Russian-speaking residents. This is a phenomenon rarely seen in Latvia to date, and it is not easy to assess. However, since this survey was conducted nationwide via face-to-face interviews, supporters of Sovereign Power—an emerging anti-establishment party—may have faced social pressure making it difficult for them to identify as such (the so-called “social desirability bias”). In reality, there were likely slightly more Sovereign Power supporters at that time.

When broken down by generation, support for Progressive is firmly established among younger voters. Support for established center-right parties—such as New Unity, National Alliance, and the Green and Farmers’ Union—rises with age. On the other hand, there is little generational disparity in support for the United List and Latvia First. It can be inferred that this is one of the reasons for the high support ratings of these two parties.

 

 

While this is related to age groups, let’s also examine the relationship with media exposure. Surprisingly, the frequency of TikTok use is not strongly correlated with support for Sovereign Power or “For Stability!”; a correlation is observed only with support for Latvia First (Figure 3). The same holds true for time spent on Instagram and YouTube; on Instagram in particular, the longer the usage time, the higher the support for anti-establishment parties (primarily Latvia First), while support for established traditional parties tends to decrease. Support for Progressive shows a nearly identical trend in this regard. On the other hand, no clear effect is observed for Facebook. Although we refer to them collectively as “social media,” it is necessary to consider the distinct characteristics of each platform (the fact that Facebook users tend to be middle-aged and older than users of other social media platforms is likely a relevant factor). Groups that spend a lot of time watching traditional television generally support established political parties. Although the survey also asked about newspaper subscriptions, we have omitted this data here because the vast majority of respondents reported that they do not read newspapers at all.

 

Finally, let’s examine the relationship between how voters cast their ballots in the 2022 election and which parties they support this time around (Figure 4). What is clear is the difficult position New Unity finds itself in. While other major parties have retained more than half of their 2022 supporters and are also attracting voters from other parties, New Unity has lost more than half of its previous voters and has seen almost no influx of voters from other parties. Many former New Unity supporters have come to back the United List, and the party has also gained popularity among supporters of other center-right parties, such as the Green and Farmers’ Union and the National Alliance. Although New Unity had pursued so-called neoliberal economic policies, it failed to solidify support among the economic “winners” in this election. While I will omit the specific data here, highly educated voters and those in the middle-to-high income brackets shifted their support to the United List. Expectations and empathy for Kulbergs as a successful businessperson appear to be spreading even among the establishment.

 

Latvian elections are conducted under a proportional representation system to fill all 100 seats. Seats are allocated in each electoral district using the modified Sainte-Laguë method for political parties that receive at least 5% of the vote. The country is divided into five districts: Latvia’s four traditional regions plus the capital, Riga.

The election results themselves have already been widely reported, so this commentary will limit itself to providing an overview. As a result of the October 3 election, the United List significantly increased its number of seats, rising from 15 in the previous election to 41. Its 35.3% share of the vote represents the highest support rate ever recorded for the leading party in Latvia’s constitutional history (since the first election in 1922).

 
However, this does not constitute a victory for the ruling coalition as a whole. The New Unity and the National Alliance, which formed the ruling coalition, each saw a significant drop in the number of seats they won: New Unity fell from 26 seats in the previous election to 7, while the National Alliance dropped from 13 to 10. For the National Alliance in particular, 10 seats marks an all-time low. Furthermore, another centerist party, the Green and Farmers’ Union, failed to clear the 5% electoral threshold and did not win any seats. The loss of seats by the Green and Farmers’ Union—which has the longest tradition and historical background among the parties running in this election—has been received with surprise, better or worse, by some segments of Latvian society (while the international media did not pay attention this). One of the underlying causes is said to be the betrayal within the ruling coalition last year regarding the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention (the Green and Farmers’ Union, despite being part of the ruling coalition, voted in favor of the withdrawal motion proposed by the opposition); it is also undeniable that the drunk-driving scandal involving a cabinet minister about a month before Election Day also played a role.

Conversely, as mentioned repeatedly in this commentary, Latvia First and Sovereign Power significantly increased their number of seats. Latvia First rose from 9 seats in the previous election to 17, while Sovereign Power increased its share of the vote from 3.3% in the previous election to 11.7%, securing 15 seats after having none previously. Among the parties representing the Russian-speaking population, For Stability!, which had won 11 seats in the previous election, received 1.99% of the vote and won no seats, falling just short of the 2% threshold required to qualify for public funding. Harmony, which once dominated the political landscape, received less than 1% of the vote, and it can be said that Sovereign Power has firmly cemented its position.

Meanwhile, the value-liberal Progressive party secured 10 seats in this election, matching the 10 it won in the previous election (with a slight increase in the vote share). Although it had been part of the ruling coalition until the Silina administration, it withdrew from the coalition in May 2026 following a conflict within the coalition and can be said to have success in blame-avoidance.

While the short-tenured Kulbergs and the United List did not face a punitive vote for the past administration’s failures, the vote to punish that previous administration fell entirely to New Unity and the Green and Farmers’ Union. As mentioned earlier, the Green and Farmers’ Union suffered an unprecedented defeat, losing all of its seats, and New Unity also saw virtually all of its former cabinet members lose their seats. Former Prime Minister Silina is expected to be elected by a narrow margin, but at the same time, he stands out for receiving the high number of negative votes from those who voted for New Unity. Including the fact that heavyweights such as long-time party leader Ašeradens and faction leader Abu-Meri were excluded from seat allocation due to a large number of negative votes and consequently lost their seats, it appears that even New Unity’s support base has effectively delivered a resounding “no” to its current leadership. Although both parties are likely to face difficult times for a while, the New Unity has recovered from similar setbacks in the past, and the Green and Farmers’ Union maintains a strong base in local assemblies. The results of this election do not signal the end of either party’s influence.

 

What is important is the various statistical data accompanying the election results. As has already been reported, the 51.8% voter turnout in this general election was a record low. In reality, this was an election that failed to generate much enthusiasm. Voter turnout was particularly low in the southeastern Latgale region—where many Russian-speaking residents live—and in the capital, Riga; in these two constituencies, turnout fell below 50%. While there has long been a tendency for Russian-speaking residents—who do not fully support Latvia’s successive governments and policies—to disengage from the electoral process due to political distrust, this trend appears to have accelerated this time, partly due to the absence of a moderate Russian-speaking political party.

Looking at the parties that placed first in each municipality, the United List secured the highest share of the vote in nearly all regions (Figure 5). This elimination of regional disparities is also highly unusual; it appears to be the first time in Latvian electoral history—excluding the authoritarian and Soviet eras—that a single party has emerged as the leading party in every municipality, with the exception of the southeastern region, where the Russian-speaking population is concentrated. In past Latvian elections, it was customary for Russian-speaking parties to dominate the southeastern Latgale and Riga—areas with large Russian-speaking populations—while various Latvian-oriented parties took first place in other regions. This time, however, such regional disparities were absent, and the United List came in first in all municipalities except Latgale. This serves as clear evidence that the United List succeeded in garnering nationwide support while respecting the distinct characteristics of each region.

Furthermore, the party that received the highest percentage of the vote in the Latgale region was not the Russian-speaking party Sovereign Power, but rather Latvia First, which, in its platform, incorporates cross-ethnic elements. A closer look suggests that protecting regional interests appears to be just as important as linguistic identity. For example, while Ms. Petkeviča of “Latvia First” received the most votes in Latgale, she is also the leader of the local party “Daugavpils – mana pils.” Many of that party’s members are employees of the local railway company DLRR, and Šlesers—who has overseen numerous infrastructure projects—had been fervently advocating for the protection of that company’s interests. There are factors at play here that go beyond the superficial explanation that people support a party with somewhat pro-Russian leanings simply because they live in a region with a large Russian-speaking population.

Meanwhile, Sovereign Power expanded its support by holding street canvassing centered on Riga, which has many Soviet-style housing estates. In fact, in Riga, it was Sovereign Power—not Latvia First—that secured the second-highest share of the vote, trailing only the United List. Sovereign Power garnered particularly strong support in neighborhoods with Soviet-style housing estates, such as Purvciems, Ķengarags, Imanta, Pļavnieki, and Zolitūde (Figure 6). These five neighborhoods alone are home to approximately one in ten of Latvia’s total population and about one in three of Riga’s residents; securing a stronghold there is of critical importance from the perspective of Latvia as a whole. Here, too, support appears to be based not merely on the simplistic notion that Russian speakers automatically support Russian-affiliated parties, but rather on the party’s close connection to daily life in these suburban housing estates, where residents are not particularly well-off.

 

As for the electoral volatility index—an academic metric that calculates the degree of seat turnover since the previous election—the volatility rate was 0.49. Roughly speaking, this means that approximately half of the parliament’s composition was replaced. This, too, is the highest value recorded for Latvia since the restoration of independence. On the other hand, this turnover was primarily driven by shifts in support within existing political parties. In the past Latvia Saeima elections, the phenomenon of “political parties that did not exist at the time of the previous election” winning seats has been observed every time (with the sole exception of the 2010 general election), but this did not occur this time. In terms of the stability of the party system, this was an unusual development—in a positive sense. It can be said that this situation was brought about by the combination of the United List and Kulbergs—organizations with substance and continuity, but whose public faces were effectively newcomers.

 

  Taking a comprehensive look at the indicators related to these election results, the following summary can be drawn: With the largest-ever shift in seats, a victory achieved with the highest share of the vote, and nationwide support, the election results truly represented a landslide victory for the United List. However, this victory was not the result of any national fervor; rather, it was born out of a lack of enthusiasm, as evidenced by the lowest voter turnout on record. The other parties in the ruling coalition suffered crushing defeats across the board. The social reality here differs somewhat from the superfacial explaination seen in the media—that “Latvia’s long-standing pro-NATO, pro-Ukraine, and anti-Russia stance has been strongly endorsed, leading to a major victory for the ruling coalition.” A more accurate assessment is that, due to a variety of factors—including missteps, criticism, and the broader context—the established political forces saw their influence wane, and relatively new forces capitalized on this opening to gain more seats. While the United List—whose platform does not differ significantly from that of the existing ruling party—was indeed the top choice for voters, parties such as Latvia First and Sovereign Power, which have strongly challenged the status quo of Latvian politics, also saw a significant increase in support. Therefore, this election should be recorded not as a victory for the Union List, but as an election in which the long-lasting established forces—New Unity, the Greens and Farmers Union, the National Alliance (and Harmony)—which have formed Latvian party politics throughout the 2000s, were decisively rejected.

In any case, however, the Union List won a landslide victory—one of unprecedented magnitude. How will this result affect the country’s foreign relations? Regarding policies related to international relations, supporters of the Coalition List—for better or worse—do not stand out within Latvian society and are very similar to the existing ruling party, New Unity. On issues such as energy prices versus the strict enforcement of sanctions against Russia (guns or butter), or whether to accept or reject immigrants, the responses of Coalition List supporters are less distinctive compared to those of supporters of other parties (Figure 7). While they hold views on the European Green Deal and withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention that differ somewhat from those of past administrations—and there is a possibility that these issues (particularly the latter) could resurface and become contentious—as long as the United List holds the position of head of government, it is unlikely to propose policies that deviate significantly from Latvia’s established foreign policy course. 

 

Crucially, this also depends on which political parties become coalition partners. The direction of a government centered on the United List will likely be influenced by the policy orientations of its coalition partners. The coalition that would form the smallest winning coalition with the closest policy alignment is a 51-seat alliance with the National Alliance, which holds 10 seats; however, since losing even a single member would result in the loss of a majority, this coalition lacks stability. There has also been talk of adding the 7 seats held by New Unity to form a three-party coalition with 58 seats, but Kulbergs himself denied this plan the day after the election results were announced (the president had already tasked Kulbergs with forming a government).

If Latvia First were to become a coalition partner, this would also secure a stable 58-seat majority. Although Klubergs also rejected this proposal during a post-election press conference, Šlesers—whose proposal was rejected—continues to signal that even if Latvia First cannot become a coalition partner and the Union List forms a minority government on its own, Latvia First is  prepared to support that government in parliament as an extra-parliamentary partner. If Latvia First does not insist on joining a coalition, the 17 seats it holds as the second-largest party in parliament will wield significant influence over the next four years. In addition, rather than shifting toward the conservative side, such as a three-party coalition comprising the United List, the Reform Party, and the New Unity Party, totaling 58 seats could be possible theoretically.

The United List—thanks to its landslide victory—has numerous coalition possibilities. Consequently, though it may seem paradoxical, it has been pointed out that precisely because of this landslide victory, the United List will face significant scrutiny regarding its governance responsibilities in the next administration. In the past, Latvian coalition governments were often formed under the premise that, after excluding Russian-speaking parties and avoiding parties with mutual animosity, there was effectively no other option for a coalition. Even the head of government could not maintain power without respecting the wishes of coalition partners, and it was often practically impossible to cut ties with one partner and switch to another. In such situations, the head of government could easily evade responsibility for a lack of executive capacity or failure to fulfill campaign promises. However, the United List now has a vast array of coalition options. It secured such a landslide victory that it would be difficult to attribute any failure to implement its campaign promises and policies to the coalition partners.

 

What the United List has gained from this election is not merely an overwhelming majority in parliament, but also a significant responsibility for policy implementation. Against the backdrop of a landslide victory fueled by disappointment with established political forces and low voter turnout, what kind of coalition government will the United List form, and what policy achievements will it be able to demonstrate? Will it be able to address the dissatisfaction with established forces revealed in this election and bring new stability to Latvian party politics? If it fails to meet these expectations, that disappointment will—this time for certain—be directed at the United List itself.