# An Unequal Agreement: Revisiting the 1951 Diet Deliberations on the Japan-US Security Treaty

Ichiro Kaji
Project Researcher, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology,
University of Tokyo

**Abstract**

The 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty had many shortcomings, most critical being the absence of a US commitment to defend Japan, making it an "unequal" treaty for Japan. To gain the Diet's approval, the Shigeru Yoshida Administration had to present the treaty as a fair agreement. How they achieved this is explained in the memoirs of former key officials, who stated that effective interpretation of the treaty obligated the US to defend Japan. However, these memoirs fall short in providing detailed explanations of this interpretation within the treaty's clauses. This paper clarifies the government's logic by revisiting the Diet minutes chronicling the deliberations. A review of the Diet minutes reveals that in addition to evoking the treaty's spirit, officials used precedents such as the North Atlantic Treaty to argue for its fairness. However, even among ruling party members, the treaty text was considered too problematic to justify an equal agreement. Despite stating that the Security Treaty was the "key" to Japan's entry into the community of equal sovereign nations, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida failed to convince Diet members of the treaty's equality.

**Keywords:** Japan-US Security Treaty, Diet, Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese Politics, Diplomacy

## 1. Introduction

The 1951 Japan-United States Security Treaty was an "unequal treaty" for Japan. This view has been widely held in Japan's collective consciousness since the 1950s. For example, Mamoru Shigemitsu, President of the conservative opposition, Kaishin To (the Reformist Party), called for a revision of the "unequal treaty" on November 24, 1952.[1] The Social Democratic Party of Japan also insisted that the "unequal treaty" should be revised and abolished.[2] Diplomatic historian Kazuya Sakamoto stated in his book, "The security treaty, to be fair, fulfilled a huge role for nine years in ensuring Japanese national security. It occasioned immense dissatisfaction, however, in the Japanese government and in the Japanese populace."[3]

What part of the Security Treaty is unequal? Takezo Shimoda, who served as Director General of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the Security Treaty came into effect, summarized its flaws in the following six areas: lack of US commitments to defend Japan; ambiguous treaty duration; unclear relationship with the UN Charter;

absence of Japanese checks on the actions of US forces in Japan (no prior consultation system); allowance of US forces to respond to riots and disturbances in Japan at the request of the Japanese government; stipulation of prior US consent when Japan grants bases and other rights to third countries.[4] Other issues included the Constitution, the Administrative Agreement, and the Okinawa/Ogasawara Islands.[5] These shortcomings prompted many criticize the 1951 Security Treaty as a mere stationing agreement permitting the US presence in Japan.

Japanese negotiators from the administration of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida also viewed the Security Treaty as problematic. They had been forced to make many compromises during negotiations with the US. However, the Yoshida administration needed its parliament, the National Diet, to ratify the imperfect treaty. This required cunning logic to convey the treaty's equal nature. Explanations of how this was achieved in the Diet were summarized in the memoirs of Prime Minister Yoshida and Kumao Nishimura, Director General of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, their memoirs do not fully explain all the provisions: they concentrated on the issues of US defense obligations to Japan and US forces in Japan. They defended the Security Treaty by saying that although the treaty lacked a US defense commitment to Japan, given its spirit, a de facto commitment did exist. How did they defend the other clauses? Did their explanations convince the members of the Diet? It is well known that opposition party members opposed the Security Treaty, but did the ruling party members wholeheartedly agree to the treaty? Few studies have examined these Diet deliberations in such detail.

This paper focuses on the provisions of the Security Treaty deemed unequal and examines how the government addressed them by examining the Diet deliberations. This paper does not add any new facts or perspectives to the study of the Japan-US Security Treaty. Instead, it examines how the government defended the treaty during the Diet deliberations, picks up on overlooked facts, and reaffirms the strength of postwar Japan's political energy to revise the Security Treaty.

## 2. Japan-US Negotiations

How did the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty become unequal? In a nutshell, the reason was that Japan was not capable or prepared to create an equal relationship with the United States. When negotiating the Security Treaty, the Japanese government held the policy that "Japan will ensure internal security by itself," and "As regards external security, the cooperation of the United Nations and, especially of the United States, is desired, through appropriate means."[6] These "appropriate means" meant Japan-US defense cooperation in Japan, including the stationing of US forces in Japan. As for Japan's defensive power, Shigeru Yoshida intended to rearm gradually. At the meeting with his advisory group on October 5, 1950, Yoshida stated, "In fact, we'll rearm, but before a treaty is concluded, we'll take the position that we don't want to rearm."[7] In his memoirs, he cited three reasons for slow rearmament: (1) Japan's low economic power, (2) the Japanese people's aversion to armaments, and (3) the problems resulting from the war's ongoing resolutions.[8] The Japanese government considered creating a security cooperation relationship with the US under Article 51 of the UN, offering resources including bases, Japanese productive power, and police forces to the US and liberal states in exchange for US military power.[9]

The US government considered the Japanese government's position to be an insufficient contribution to the liberal order.

Although Washington considered security cooperation with Japan necessary for its own national security and the security of East Asia, they found it difficult to conclude a treaty with Japan as an equal partner until Japan had sufficient defense forces as defined by the US Senate's Vandenberg Resolution, which stipulated security cooperation only with states that provide continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. John F. Dulles, Special Representative in the peace treaty negotiations, and who visited Japan in January 1951 to negotiate with Yoshida, stated the following at a meeting with his staff on February 5, 1951:

> Ambassador Dulles agreed that it probably would be desirable to retain Chapter VIII in some form. He went on to say that when Japan, following amendment of its Constitution, is in a position to make precise commitments such as we are trying to obtain from European countries, commitments to contribute a certain number of divisions by a certain date, then we will be in a position to make more concrete commitments ourselves. Until then we must maintain a flexible position.[10]

In negotiations, the US demanded rights to station US forces in Japan but did not make clear its commitments to defend Japan. This is the primary reason why the Security Treaty became an unequal treaty for Japan.[11] Director General Kumao Nishimura recalled three limiting factors that prevented equal security cooperation between the United States and Japan: (1) Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, (2) Japan's lack of sufficient military power, and (3) the US attitude as the occupying power of Japan.[12] As a result of a change in (3) over time, and in US policies toward (1) and (2),[13] the Security Treaty was revised in 1960 when a new, more equal "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan" was concluded between the two countries.[14]

In brief, since Japan did not have sufficient capabilities, the US did not regard Japan as a full-fledged ally and refused to accept an "equal" treaty.

### 3. Diet Deliberations

It is well known that the Diet deliberations on the revised Security Treaty in 1960 were heated and prompted large-scale protests around Japan (*Anpo Sodo*). But various issues were also discussed in 1951 when the "unequal" treaty was initially deliberated. How was the discourse in the Diet framed at that time?

To discuss and ratify the Security Treaty, Japan's Diet established the Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committees in the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors after Prime Minister Yoshida signed the Peace Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951. The Special Committee deliberations began in the House of Representatives on October 11, 1951, where Man-itsu Tanaka, a member of the ruling Liberal Party, chaired the committee. In the House of Councilors, Nobuyuki Okuma, a grandson of former Prime Minister Shigenobu Okuma, chaired the committee that began on October 18. The committees in both Houses were composed of representatives of the six leading parties: the three conservative parties were the ruling Liberal Party, the opposition National Democratic Party, and the opposition Ryokufu Kai; the three opposition reformist parties were the Right Socialist, the Left Socialist, and the Japanese Communist Party. Key members leading the deliberations were Hitoshi Ashida,[15] Yasuhiro Nakasone,[16] Eiichi Nishimura,[17] Takeo Miki,[18] and Eki Sone.[19] Other leading and minority party members were also involved.[20]

In addition to focusing on the contents of the Security Treaty, the deliberations sought to clarify a number of issues including the relationship between the Constitution and the Security Treaty, the Administrative Agreement under negotiations between Japan and the US, and the Acheson-Yoshida Notes, which concluded Japan's assistance to UN forces in the Korea War. As noted in the Introduction, this paper will focus primarily on the issues of inequality arising from the Security Treaty articles, particularly the six areas mentioned by Shimoda. What parts of the treaty did these Diet members take issue with, and how did government officials respond to them?

**4. Lack of US Defense Commitments toward Japan**

Most members of the Committees of both Houses criticized the lack of US defense commitments to Japan. Article I provided that US forces may be utilized to contribute to any external attacks on Japan, or suppression of large-scale internal riots and disturbances at the express request of the Japanese government. This led to criticisms by Diet members from both the ruling and opposition parties—conservatives and reformists—that the US defense commitments to Japan were not assured. Eiichi Nishimura stated, "What I find most puzzling about the Japan-US Security Treaty is that there is no provision for US commitments for the defense of Japan."[21] Eki Sone characterized it as a stationing agreement rather than an ordinary security treaty.[22]

These concerns were shared not only by opposition party members but also by the ruling party members. In his supportive speech on the Security Treaty, Goro Morishima, representing the Liberal Party, expressed his concerns about the absence of mutuality in the treaty:

> However, as long as the Vandenberg Resolution exists, there is no choice. When we can't obtain the best, we must choose the next best. This treaty is the next best. Moreover, this treaty is provisional.[23]

Naoyoshi Kitazawa also stressed that the treaty was provisional and stated that the Japanese people had not only hope but also concerns, worries, and doubts about the treaties, including the Peace Treaty.[24]

Government officials understood these criticisms. Yoshida recalled, "the most important of the points we wanted from the US was to clearly state in the agreements the US responsibility for Japan's security."[25] Japanese foreign affairs officials were eager for US commitments during several negotiations with the US but were unable to secure US assurances.[26] These officials were left in a bind: they failed in their negotiations with the US, however, they could not announce to the public and the Diet that there were no mutual defense commitments. Their response to critiques that they failed to secure a clear US defense commitment has been well-documented: they developed the logic that there was a de facto commitment. As stated in his memoirs, Yoshida said that the US would not be able to sit idly by if any invasion were to occur against Japan while hosting US forces.[27] Kumao Nishimura said that the US would exercise its right of individual self-defense in such a situation.[28]

They gave the same answers to the committee's deliberations as they had in their memoirs. In response to Eiichi Nishimura, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida countered:

> When Japan's security is violated, it is not realistic to expect the US forces in Japan to stand idly by and watch as US soldiers are killed because there are no obligations, so such a commitment

naturally arises.

Yoshida reiterated that what was essential was the treaty's spirit and that the lack of commitment provisions did not mean that the US would stand by and watch aggression against Japan.[29]

The government explained to the Diet that substance, not form, matters. The Diet members, however, considered form to be more critical because the condition in which the US had rights but no obligations to Japan was a matter of self-dignity for the Japanese people. Yoshida later denounced these positions by Diet members as *Sanbyaku Daigen* (sophomoric interpretations).[30] However, the lack of commitments, which even government officials considered problematic, remained a critical issue for Japan until the treaty was revised in 1960.

## 5. US Assistance for Japan's Internal Security

Along with the lack of US defense commitments to Japan, many Diet members regarded the clause allowing the US to "put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan" at the express request of the Japanese government as dishonorable. The government, however, needed US assistance to maintain domestic stability in Japan due to Japan's weak police force.[31] On the other hand, they also wanted to avoid expressions that would upset the feelings of the Japanese people.[32] Finally, the internal security that the US could assist with was limited to cases "caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers."

During the deliberations, most major parties, except the ruling party, opposed this provision. Hitoshi Ashida, a former prime minister, strongly opposed dependence on the US, even for internal security. He said:

> The government requested this approach from the US because it was not confident in its ability to maintain Internal security. It is a severe problem that Japan must rely on foreign military forces to maintain Internal security. If that is true, Japan is in nature a protectorate, even though it appears to be an independent country.[33]

Takeo Miki also criticized this provision. He stated that Japan should be responsible for maintaining its internal security.[34] In the House of Councilors, Soji Okada denounced it, saying that it would allow the US to interfere in Japan's internal affairs.[35]

How did government officials respond to these concerns? In the Diet, they argued that this provision was not unique. Kumao Nishimura defended the provision, saying that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had similar commitments. He referenced US Secretary of State Dean Acheson's statement regarding Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for joint defense against an armed attack, that "Purely internal revolutionary activity would not be regarded as an armed attack; a revolutionary activity inspired, armed directed from the outside, however, [is] a different matter."[36] Nishimura, therefore, pointed out that US assistance is limited to cases "caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers" and countered that because the situation was the same as in NATO, the provision was not unequal for Japan.

In response to Nishimura's rebuttal, Okada suggested the difference between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty was that the latter specified US assistance in internal disturbances in its text, whereas the North Atlantic Treaty did so by interpretation, and this difference was significant. Nishimura's argument was legal and not politically

appropriate: there was no precedent other than the Security Treaty for specifying it in the article, as Okada pointed out. Nishimura himself stated, "I can't say we've set a good precedent."[37]

Yoshida did not give a positive answer on this issue. When Ashida or Okada asked him for an answer, he would either say it was a necessary clause or leave the response to Kumao Nishimura. Yoshida, unlike Nishimura, did not actively defend this provision by providing examples from the North Atlantic Treaty or others.

### 6. The Stationing of US Forces in Japan

Members of the reformist opposition parties, the Right and Left Socialists, and the Communists were particularly opposed to the stationing of US forces in Japan. They argued that the US presence was an infringement on Japan's national sovereignty and that it could lead Japan into war. Communist Itaru Yonehara compared one protocol with the Security Treaty. It was the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol stipulating that Japanese troops be stationed in Manchukuo. He argued that Japan would also become a US colony by mentioning that Manchukuo was, in effect, a Japanese colony.[38] Masanosuke Ikeda also stated that the public was mulling it over even if it was unavoidable.[39]

This issue was more of a policy issue than one of equality. In response to this most controversial issue in postwar Japanese politics, Yoshida cited the US troops stationed in Western European countries as an example and stated that the current era was one of joint defense.[40] Ryuen Kusaba, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, also refuted Ikeda by giving specific numbers of divisions stationed in Western European countries.

The problem of equality related to the US forces in Japan was the lack of a prior consultation system. Shiro Kiuchi was one of the politicians who discussed the issue of prior consultation during the Special Committee deliberations. His argument arose from the relationship between actions of US forces in Japan and security for Japan. He questioned whether bases would be attacked when US forces in Japan were deployed to other areas without prior consultation with Japan. In response to Kiuchi’s question, Nishimura explained that prior consultation would naturally occur given the treaty’s spirit.[41] Yoshida let Nishimura’s answer stand and did not clarify his stance on the issue. However, the United States and Japanese governments did not make arrangements for prior consultation. It was during the mid-1950s that discussions on prior consultation began in earnest.[42]

### 7. Other Issues

Article II stipulated that "Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of the garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power." Eki Sone pointed out in the House of Councilors that this provision, which stipulated the prior consent of the US, represented the unequal relationship between the US and Japan.

There was a clear rebuttal to this criticism. Nishimura demonstrably countered that Article VIII of the North Atlantic Treaty contained a similar provision: Article VIII stipulated, “Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.”[43] Nishimura himself, however, recognized that this clause was one that the Japanese government did not like.[44] Yoshida's reaction to this issue

is unknown since he was absent from the meeting.

Another problem was that the treaty's duration was de facto indefinite. Article IV, which defines the term of validity of the treaty, stipulates the intent that the treaty will continue unless the US and Japanese governments agree otherwise. It was not so much this provision that the Diet members took issue with, but rather the consequences of this provision. They feared that the unequal provisions, as discussed in this paper, would be rendered permanent by the treaty's indeterminate duration. Therefore, Hitoshi Ashida and Eki Sone were concerned that Article IV would fix the provision of US assistance to Japan's internal security and the stationing of US forces, respectively.[45]

To these complaints, the government reiterated that the treaty was provisional. What were the conditions for revision of the treaty if it is provisional? One was for Japan to rebuild enough military power to make a new treaty with the US on equal terms. To aim to create an "equal" treaty with the US, Yasuhiro Nakasone pressed Yoshida to state his determination for "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid," as described in the Vandenberg Resolution. Yoshida, however, maintained the principle that the Security Treaty was a treaty of equality, replying that it was not a one-sided treaty. In response to Nakasone's insistence, Yoshida replied coldly, "I will consider your opinion."[46]

## 8. Conclusion

In response to criticisms from members of the National Diet that the Japan-US Security Treaty is "unequal," the government asserted the treaty's equality in two ways: evoking the spirit of the Security Treaty and the precedents of other treaties, notably the North Atlantic Treaty. Yoshida and his government strived to prove that the Security Treaty was an equal agreement in all its provisions.

Despite the logic used to counter arguments criticizing its inequality and the impossibility of gaining US concessions on mutual defense, the Security Treaty was not valued as the "next best" treaty even by the ruling party members. One reason, as many Diet members pointed out, is that the text of the treaty itself was problematic. But also important to the treaty's lack of acceptance was the attitude of Shigeru Yoshida. As discussed in this paper, Yoshida did not respond actively to issues shared by the ruling and opposition parties; on the contrary, he recognized no significant controversy in the Diet. He relied on Kumao Nishimura for most of his responses.

Yoshida also showed a dismissive attitude toward the Diet members in his memoirs. Yoshida stated, "A political treaty like the Security Treaty is not qualified to be discussed together unless you read not only the words on paper but also the implications between the lines."[47] He recalled those days as follows:

> There was considerable opposition to the security treaty. In the end, however, this was not a significant issue, and the newspapers were only lively in reporting the discussions between Hitoshi Ashida and me.[48]

Not only was there a gap between the rights and obligations of the US and Japan, but there also existed a perception gap between the Prime Minister and Diet members, which further exacerbated the people's image of the 1951 Security Treaty. Masataka Kosaka, a political scientist, in his classic biography of Prime Minister Yoshida assessed that public opinion had turned away from Yoshida because he could not successfully accommodate the people's independent spirit.[49] Yoshida did not take the issue of Japan's dignity seriously, as Diet members insisted. Kumao Nishimura was not qualified to address

this issue because he was a bureaucrat.

In a brief speech on the day the Security Treaty was signed, Yoshida said, “That treaty gives Japan the key for re-entering the community of nations as a sovereign equal.”[50] However, as this paper has confirmed, the treaty, perceived as unequal by the reformist and conservative opposition parties and the ruling Liberal Party, could not be called the "key" to equality. The Japanese had to wait until the 1960 revision to get this “key.”

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[20] Other leading members: Masanosuke Ikeda, the Liberal Party; Naoyoshi Kitazawa, the Liberal Party, who served as a secretary to Prime Minister Yoshida in 1945; Shiro Kiuchi, a member of the National Democratic Party; Hisao Kuroda, Chairperson of the Laborers and Farmers Party; Goro Morishima, a member of the Liberal Party, who was a diplomat until 1946; Hanji Ogawa, a member of the National Democratic Party; Soji Okada, a member of the Left Socialist; Itaru Yonehara, a member of Japanese Communist Party.
[21] Minutes of the 3rd The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives, October 18, 1951, accessed on July 20, 2022, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101205185X00319511018
[22] Minutes of the 5th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Councilors, October 25, 1951, accessed on July 20, 2022, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101215185X00519511029
[23] Minutes of the 9th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives, October 25, 1951, accessed on July 20, 2022, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101205185X00919511025
[24] Minutes of the 3rd The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives.
[25] Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaiso Junen 3*, p.145.
[26] Ayako Kusunoki, *Yoshida Shigeru to Anzenhosho Seisaku no Keisei*, pp.228-232.
[27] Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaiso Junen 3*, p.145.
[28] Kumao Nishimura, *San Franshisuko Heiwa Joyaku*, p.49.
[29] Minutes of the 3rd The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives.
[30] Shigeru Yoshida, *Sekai to Nihon*, (Chuokoron, 1992) p.163.
[31] Goro Fujita, "Ashida Shokan no Saikento [Reconsidering the Ashida Memorandum: The Relationship Between the Plan of Emergency Stationing of US Forces and the Police Reform of 1947]," *Kokusai Seiji [International Relations]*, vol.207 (2022), pp.138-140.
[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Heiwa Joyaku no Teiketsu ni Kansuru Chosho Dainisatsu [vol.2]*, p.213.
[33] Minutes of the 3rd The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives. This Ashida's question at the committee is known as the Yoshida-Ashida debate. See Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzenhosho*, (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1997), pp.93-97.
[34] Minutes of the 9th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives.
[35] Minutes of the 7th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Councilors, October 31, 1951, accessed on July 20, 2022, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101215185X00719511031

[36] "Acheson's Replies at Press Conference on Atlantic Pact," *The New York Times*, (March 19, 1949), accessed on July 20, 2022, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/03/19/issue.html
[37] Minutes of the 7th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Councilors.
[38] Minutes of the 4th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives, October 19, 1951, accessed on July 20, 2022, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101205185X00419511019
[39] Minutes of the 3rd The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives.
[40] Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaiso Junen 4*, pp.41-44.
[41] Minutes of the 5th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Councilors.
[42] See the following for studies of the issues of prior consultation and its negotiations between Japan and the US: Kazuya Sakamoto, *Nichinei Domei no Kizuna*; "Iwayuru Mitsuyaku Mondai ni Kansuru Yushikisha Iinkai Hokokusho," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2010), accessed on July 20, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf; Takashi Shinobu,*Nichibei Anpo to Jizen Kyogiseido [The US-Japan Security Treaty and Prior Consultation]*, (Kobundo.2014).
[43] Minutes of the 19th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Councilors, accessed on July 20, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101215185X01919511115
[44] Kumao Nishimura, *San Franshisuko Heiwa Joyaku*, p.56.
[45] Minutes of the 3rd The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives; Minutes of the 5th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Councilors.
[46] Minutes of the 8th The Peace Treaty of San Francisco and Japan-US Security Treaty Special Committee of the House of Representatives, October 24, 1951, accessed on July 20, 2022, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101205185X00819511024
[47] Shigeru Yoshida, *Sekai to Nihon*, p.163.
[48] Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaiso Junen 3*, p.65.
[49] Masataka Kosaka, *Saisho Yoshida Shigeru*, (Chuokoron 1968), pp.74-89.
[50] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Heiwa Joyaku no Teiketsu ni Kansuru Chosho Daiyonsatsu [vol.4],* Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2001): pp.368-369, accessed on July 20, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/pdfs/heiwajouyaku4_08.pdf